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SUMMARY
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or the "Code") revisions now
underway will have a significant and long lasting impact on consumers. Part I
of this piece summarizes the key issues for consumers which have developed
in the drafting of Articles 2, 2B, and 9. Part II examines the structural barriers
to full and effective consideration of the impact of revisions to the UCC on
consumers. The barriers arise in part from the limitations of adequate
numbers of staff and expertise on these very specialized topics within the
consumer movement. The barriers are exacerbated, however, by the drawn-
out nature of the drafting process; the tradition of openness to observers, most
of whom represent affected industries; and to some degree, by the nature of
the pool from which Uniform Law Commissioners are drawn.
Part I identifies some of the changes in law being made in the drafts of
Articles 2, 2B, and 9 and the possible impacts on consumers because of those
changes. Part IV describes the types of nonuniform amendments state
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legislatures have made to Articles 3 and 4. That experience suggests the
questions that uniform law drafters should ask themselves-and should
expect from legislators-about any new UCC draft. Part V offers some
suggestions for making the UCC drafting process more amenable to
considering the impacts of changes to the Uniform Commercial Code on
consumers and other underrepresented groups.
How Articles 2, 2B, and 9 treat consumers will reflect on the integrity of
the uniform law drafting process and on the credibility of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (CNCCUSL"' or the
"Conference") and the American Law Institute ("ALI") as law reform bodies.
In light of the extreme difficulty for consumers or their advocates to
participate fully in the process of the drafting of the UCC, both the
Conference and the ALL have a special responsibility to weigh the fairness of
uniform law drafts on consumers and to refuse to promulgate any draft which
does not provide fair and workable provisions for consumer commerce. The
Conference and the ALl should shoulder the responsibility of protecting the
interests of consumers and small businesses who are not fully represented in
the uniform law drafting process, reject proposed UCC provisions in Articles
2 and 2B which would limit consumers' rights against unscrupulous sellers of
goods or software, and avoid conferring broad new rights on creditors in the
revision of Article 9. If they fail to do so, state legislators' concerns about the
impact of UCC changes on their consumer constituents may impede uniform
adoption of these drafts.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF CHANGES TO THE UCC AFFECTING
CONSUMERS ARISING IN ARTICLES 2, 2B, AND 9
Over the next two years, NCCUSL and the ALI will make decisions
affecting nearly every American consumer. These decisions will be made in
evaluating the proposed revisions to Articles 2 and 9 of the UCC and in
evaluating the text of the new Article 2B, which will cover information
licensing. The revisions to Articles 2 and 9, and the new Article 2B, will
affect the scope of warranties and the enforceability of clauses in standard
form contracts for every kind of good sold to U.S. consumers, the
enforceability of terms in software licenses and contracts for on-line services,
and the rights and obligations of the parties to a loan secured by personal
property. The decisions made by the Conference and the ALI on these broad
revisions will affect consumers in their everyday commerce, from toasters to
automobiles, children's software to home and business accounting software,
1997]
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and car loans to margin loans.
The impact of the UCC on consumers would be difficult to overstate.' The
National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators has recognized the
UCC's importance to consumers by adopting a resolution urging the
Conference to address consumer issues in Articles 2, 3, 4, and 9.2 UCC
Article 2 provides the basic contract law for the sale of goods to consumers
and businesses in all fifty states.3 This includes the annual sale of twelve to
fifteen million new automobiles and light trucks, and a similar number of
used cars.4 Many of these sales are to consumers. Electronic goods sold to
U.S. consumers in 1994 totaled $55.9 million.' Non-automobile consumer
goods sold in the U.S. recently totaled in excess of $1.7 trillion.6 Revised
Article 2 will provide the basic rules of contract formation for all of these
transactions.
Article 2B is a proposed new statute dealing with computer software and
on-line services.7 It would provide contract law and default rules for all
software and on-line information services sold in the U.S. In 1995, according
to industry sources, sales of personal computer application software in the
United States and Canada reached $7.53 billion.' The version of Article 2B
presented to the Conference in the summer of 1996 would have dramatically
altered the balance of rights and responsibilities between software makers and
users, depriving licensees of remedies available to them under current law for
the purchase of goods. The Conference as a whole asked the drafting
committee to re-examine its decisions and to seek a better balance in the draft
between provisions favoring licensees and those favoring licensors. The
1. See Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Agency Adm'rs, Resolution: Uniform Commercial Code (19th
Annual Mtg. June 7, 1994).
2. Id.
3. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1995).
4. TELEPHONE INQUIRY TO RETAIL SALES Div., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
(1994).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B-Licenses (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on
Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B], available
at <http:l/www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclule.htm> (visited on Jan. 20, 1997). Citations will be to the
January 24, 1997 Article 2 draft and the March 21, 1997 Article 2B draft except where otherwise
noted. More recent drafts may be cited where the text of the noted section has been substantially
changed.
8. Software Publishers Association, Personal Computer Application Software Sales Reach
SZ53 Billion in North America in 1995 (Mar. 25, 1996) (press release) (visited Oct. 10, 1996)
<http://www.spa.org/research/releases/4q95namr.htm>.
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expectation that the draft will change dramatically is based on the statements
made by numerous members of NCCUSL at its 1996 annual meeting. In
substance, these comments by members of the Conference questioned the
strong pro-industry tone of the draft being presented to them and expressed
concern about a series of decisions made in that draft which selected the
licensee rather than the licensor to bear an identified risk. The decisions that
committee makes on those issues, and the response of the ALI and the
Conference to those decisions, will determine how Article 2B affects
consumers.
Finally, UCC Article 9 governs security interests in personal property
collateral, ranging from cars and furniture to uncertificated stock.9 Article 9
gives a creditor the right to repossess goods without a court order and sets the
standards for how creditors must treat property after they repossess it.
Proposed changes to Article 9 will affect what collateral a creditor can take
under the UCC, when a creditor may seek to collect a deficiency, and what
the consequences are if a creditor falls to meet the basic standard of
commercial reasonableness in disposing of collateral.'0
A. Proposed Changes to Basic Contract Law for the Sale of Goods Would
Both Help and Harm Consumers
Most of the proposed revisions to existing UCC Article 2 will help
consumers. The new Article 2 will help consumers by protecting them from
unreasonable terms when signing standard form contracts. The UCC
currently protects businesses which exchange standard forms from certain
unexpected clauses in those forms. The proposed revisions to Article 2
include a new rule in draft section 2-206 that would prohibit a seller from
enforcing terms in a form contract against a consumer if those terms could not
reasonably have been expected unless the consumer expressly agreed to the
terms." For example, a term that says that a new car will not run would be
9. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1995).
10. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and
Chattel Paper (199_) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, 1996)
[hereinafter July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9], available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited on Jan. 20, 1997).
11. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199_) § 2-206 (Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2],
available at <http:l/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 1997). The draft has
since been extensively renumbered. Citations will be to the renumbered January 1997 Article 2 Draft
except where otherwise noted. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2 Sales (Nat'l
19971
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unenforceable under this new legal rule even if the consumer had signed a
preprinted contract with that term in it, except where the seller proves that the
consumer really did agree to buy a car that did not run. 2 This section presents
the single most important improvement for consumers to emerge from the
lengthy revision process. Unfortunately, however, it is still under attack from
industry and changes to weaken it are under consideration.
Another useful change will also help consumers by simplifying
enforcement of advertised promises made by a manufacturer about goods,
even though the consumer buys the goods from a third-party retailer and not
directly from the manufacturer. 3 In the modem, national economy, advertised
promises about goods are often made by the manufacturer instead of the
retailer. Advertising can have a great influence on consumers, regardless of
whether the ads are offered by the retailer or the manufacturer.
One proposed change to Article 2 which could harm consumers is the
expansion in the right of a seller to cure a defect or breach. Under current law,
there is a post-purchase period when a consumer has an absolute right to
reject the goods and cancel the contract if the goods do not completely
comply with the contract. 4 These changes are discussed in Part III.A.
B. New Law on Software Licensing and On-Line ServicesFavors
Licensors
New UCC Article 2B would create new legal rules for the licensing of
both computer software and information services, such as on-line services.
The draft of Article 2B was presented to the Conference for discussion at its
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Jan. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2],
available at <http:/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htnr> (visited Mar. 28, 1997). After the
renumbering scheme, current Part 5 provisions are now in Part 6 and Part 7 provisions are now in Part
8.
12. Whether the new provision would also invalidate a term in a used car contract stating that the
car would not run would depend on whether, under all the circumstances of the transaction, the
consumer could have reasonably expected that term. Id. The answer might be yes for a transaction
conducted at a junkyard. The answer might be no for a sale at a used car lot which included a test drive
of a working car and a price that reflects an expectation that the car would be usable for transportation
rather than parts.
13. The advertising industry has hotly criticized this proposal. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Advertising Group to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Section 2-313
(July 2,1996) (on file with author) (prepared by Hall Dickler Kent Friedman & Wood, L.L.P.);
Memorandum from NIMA International to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (July 3, 1996) (on file with author). NIMA is the name of the entity formerly known as the
National Infomercial Marketing Association.
14. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995).
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summer 1996 annual meeting."' Many members of the Conference severely
criticized it as being too favorable to the software industry and substantial
revisions are expected. Some aspects of that draft will be discussed, both to
illustrate flaws in the uniform law drafting process and because many of its
harmful provisions have survived. However, persons interested in the impact
of the draft on software users should take care to obtain the most current draft,
as it continues to change rapidly. 6
The Article 2B draft presented to the Conference in the summer of 1996
would have harmed consumers in five key ways. 7 Two of those harms have
been removed in subsequent drafts, but three remain. First, the Summer 1996
draft would have authorized any term in a standard form contract so long as
the term was consistent with customary industry practices, even if the term
could not have been expected by the consumer or the term was the type of
term that would cause a reasonable consumer to reject the contract if he or she
had understood that term.'8 For example, suppose most software contracts had
a term stating that the software maker is not responsible for any damage that
the software does to the consumer's computer files, even if the software
maker knows that certain types of files are damaged by the program. If this
contract term were commonly used in the industry, the Summer 1996 Article
2B draft would have validated the term even if it was otherwise unreasonable
and unexpected. After the broad criticism of the Article 2B draft by the
Conference in the summer of 1996, this section was revised to eliminate this
objectionable safe harbor. However, it still measures the enforceability of a
standard form contract from the perspective of the expectations of the drafter
of the contract, rather than the expectations of the consumer or licensee upon
whom the contract is imposed.
Second, the draft would make it easy for software makers and on-line
services to eliminate responsibility for viruses. 9 This has been the subject of
additional discussion at several meetings since the summer conference. Third,
15. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7.
16. Copies of the draft are available on the Internet and can be downloaded from
<http://www.kentlaw.edu/ulc> and from the Article 2B homepage at <http://www.law.un.edu.uce2b>.
Useful information on the impact of the draft on consumers can be found at <http://www.cptech.org/
uccluce.html>.
17. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7.
18. Id. § 2B-308(b)(l).
19. Id. § 2B-320 (renumbered in Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B--Licenses § 2B-
319 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws Nov. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Nov. 1996 Draft,
Art. 2B], available in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ule.htm> (visited Jan. 24, 1997).
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the Article 2B draft would give a software maker a qualified right to reach
into a user's computer and remove its programs if the user has failed to pay or
has otherwise materially breached the contract.2" It would authorize a
software maker to seize software out of the consumer's computer, leaving the
consumer to later prove damages. Although this provision has received
extensive criticism, it remains in the draft.
Fourth, the Summer 1996 Article 2B draft would have set an
unrealistically low dividing line between those consumers who would be
treated as if they had the power to bargain with large softvare makers and
other consumers who would be treated as so-called mass-market licensees.
The draft gave somewhat broader rights to consumers, small businesses, and
others who fall into the category of mass-market licensee, but then restricted
that category to only those persons paying less than $1,000 per year for a
software program or an on-line service.2 All licensees who spend more than
this amount per program or service were generally treated as if they could
bargain over the terms of the license with a software maker or on-line service.
The unrealistic dividing line of $1000 per year, has been removed from
subsequent drafts for consumer software users, but an even cut off of $500
has been selected for nonconsumer users.22 Anyone who has ever tried to
change the terms of the prepared software license agreement that comes in the
box or appears on the monitor on the first use of the software knows that it is
highly unlikely that consumers or many businesses will be able to bargain
over these terms, even if the software they are licensing is expensive.
The fifth area of serious weakness in the Article 2B draft presented to the
Conference for discussion in the summer of 1996 was its lack of meaningful
remedies. The perfect tender rule would be eliminated, so that the right to
reject without a dispute about the degree of the non-conformance would be
lost.' The right to reject would be narrowed so that it would be triggered only
by "material" breaches, potentially forcing the consumer to retain bad
20. Id. § 2B-712 (renumbered as Section 2-313 in Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised
Article 2 Sales (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Mar. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Mar.
1997 Draft, Art. 2], available at <http:llwww.law.upenn.edulibrary/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited on Apr. 8,
1997).
21. Id. § 2B-102(26)(i)(C).
22. Nov. 1996 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 19, § 2B-102(25) alt.A & B. Draft, Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2B, Licenses § 2B-102(25) & Notes (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Laws, Mar. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Mar. 1997 Draft, Art. 2B], available at <http:/l
wwv.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited Apr. 16, 1997).
23. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, §§ 2B-601 & rptr.'s note 6, § 2B-
602.
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software and decide if it is economical to sue for damages. 4 Incidental
damages could be limited by contract to a refund of the price paid, regardless
of the amount of damage which the software caused to the user's computer or
files." The rule against consequential damages has since been removed and
some limited progress has been made in preserving the perfect tender rule.
The other weaknesses, however, remain.26
C. The Draft Revisions to Article 9 Favor Creditors
The proposed revisions to UCC Article 9 favor creditors in several ways.
The revisions make it easier to create and enforce a security interest by
expanding the types of tangible and intangible personal property collateral
creditors can take and codifying new legal obligations for creditors who
repossess property.27 The revisions are likely to expand the types of assets that
can be taken as collateral from a business, and perhaps also from a consumer.
The proposed revisions would expand the collateral that a creditor can take
under Article 9 to include a security interest in the bank accounts of small and
other businesses, including business checking and savings accounts.28
Other draft revisions to Article 9 would deprive courts of the ability to
deny a deficiency as a result of a creditor's proven violation of Article 9 in the
disposition of collateral.29 This would be the rule in commercial transactions
and an option in consumer transactions. For example, the draft would
eliminate the absolute bar rule for commercial debtors. Under that rule,
thirteen states have held that a creditor who violates obligations to a debtor
under Article 9 loses its right to pursue a deficiency against that debtor." The
24. Id. § 2B-702.
25. Id. § 2B-706(a).
26. Id. § 2A-701(a) (position changed in Nov. 1996 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 19).
27. See infra Part IlI.C.1.
28. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-107 (renumbered in Draft,
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper § 9-
104 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws Oct. 1996) [hereinafter Oct. 1996 Draft, Art.
9], available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm> (visited on Jan. 24, 1997)). Deposit
accounts are expected to remain exempt in consumer loans. Id. § 9-104(13) (renumbered in Oct. 1996
Draft, Art. 9, supra, § 9-113(13)).
29. Id. § 9-507 (renumbered in Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 28, § 9-625 alt.B).
30. Jurisdictions using the rule are Arkansas, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. One of those
states applies the rule only in consumer transactions while another applies it to consumer transactions
below $100,000 and commercial transactions below $50,000. A few jurisdictions use the rule for
notice violations only.
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drafting committee has voted to leave open the applicability of the absolute
bar doctrine in consumer transactions, so -that states in which it has been
developed through case law could retain it.3 The draft comments also
eliminate the doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure.32 Under this doctrine,
a court may find that a creditor who has waited an undue length of time to sell
repossessed property is deemed to have decided to keep the property in lieu of
selling it and seeking a deficiency.33
One of the most harmful changes for consumers in the proposed revisions
to Article 9 would provide a new defense to creditors who break the law
when they sell collateral repossessed from consumers. This new defense
could prevent consumers from obtaining the simple, easy-to-calculate remedy
of statutory damages for some types of Article 9 violations.34 Creditors will
not be punished or deterred for some legal violations to the same extent that
they are under current law.
35
Other proposed revisions to Article 9 authorize creditors to file a financing
statement in state or local records showing that the creditor has a security
interest in the property of a consumer or a business, without obtaining the
signature of the debtor, as required by current law.36 The policy issues raised
by these and other changes to Article 9 are further discussed in Part III.C.
D. The Article 2B and 9 Drafts Reveal Serious Unanswered Questions
About Whether the Uniform Law Drafting Process Will Produce UCC
Revisions Which Are Fair to Consumers
The Article 2 draft appears likely to be workable for consumers, although
some troublesome issues remain unresolved. In particular, the draft revisions
to Article 2 take a key step forward in the manner in which the new Article 2
treats standard form contracts. The draft recognizes that these transactions
involve a pattern of behavior very different from the traditional Code
paradigm of mutual agreement. It applies the basic contract law idea of the
31. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-507 rptr's cmt. 3.
32. Id. § 9-505 rptr.'s cmt. 6.
33. See U.C.C. § 9-507 (1995).
34. See infra Part IH.C.4.
35. The Consumer Issues Subcommittee has recommended that any new defenses be so narrowed
to notice violations, but it is not clear whether it will be so modified. See Memorandum from the
Article 9 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee to the Consumer Task Force Members
12 (Oct. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Consumer Issues Subcommittee Preliminary Report] (on file with
author).
36. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-402 & rptr.'s cmt. 2.
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reasonable expectations of the parties to terms that were not bargained for, but
present in preprinted contract language prepared by one party.3 7 The Article 2
draft recognizes that the reasonable expectations of both parties, not just the
drafting party, should influence what becomes part of a contract when a
standard form is used.
The drafts of Articles 2B and 9 differ sharply from the Article 2 draft in
their impact on consumers. The draft of new Article 2B was roundly
criticized by Conference members as being skewed in favor of software
makers and on-line services at the expense of consumers and other users. The
committee which produced this unbalanced draft has begun to reexamine it
Until that work is completed, it is impossible to say whether Article 2B will
be fair and equitable for U.S. consumers.
Many commentators have suggested that the new Article 9 draft tips the
balance of the law too far in favor of creditors.3" The draft exempts consumers
from some but not all of those changes. At the same time, the draft contains
an unnecessary new defense for creditors to the statutory damages currently
available under Article 9, codifies an expansive definition of purchase money
security interests which may harm consumers in bankruptcy, and creates the
possibility of interference with statutory and judicially developed remedies
available to a consumer when his or her creditor breaks the law in disposing
of the consumer's collateral.39 The draft also contains several provisions that
would be helpful to consumers. Whether the revisions to Article 9 will
ultimately be fair to consumers depends in large part on how the committee
drafts those new provisions and how other open issues are eventually
resolved.
II. STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO DEVELOPMENT OF SOUND POLICY
AFFECTING CONSUMERS IN THE UNIFORM LAW PROCESS
The uniform law process has been the subject of much debate in recent
years.4" It has been suggested that, because of their membership and
37. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2,supra note 11, § 2-206(b) &Note 1.
38. See discussion infra Part 1II.C.1.
39. See infra Part II.C.4-.6.
40. For a description of the life of a uniform law draft from inception to adoption, see Marianne
B. Culhane, The UCC Revision Process: Legislation You Should See in The Making, 26 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 29 (1992); Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the
UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) ofProfessor Rubin 's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 249, 259-265 (1994); and Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory
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procedures, groups such as the NCCUSL and the ALI "will have a strong
status quo bias and sometimes will be captured by powerful interests."' This
piece identifies a host of structural barriers in the uniform law process to
complete evaluation of the effects of UCC changes on consumers.
A. Expense ofAdvocating the Consumer Interest in a Multiyear,
Multistate Process
There are very high structural barriers to effective participation by
consumers and consumer groups in the Uniform Commercial Code process.
The first and most obvious structural barrier is the staff time needed to
effectively participate in the work of a drafting committee. Nationwide,
consumer protection agencies are short of resources to serve the pressing
existing needs of consumers in their immediate jurisdictions. Many have
simply no time or staff to devote to legislative or law-reform efforts. In 1993,
Consumer Reports documented the closing or downsizing of consumer
protection agencies from Alaska to Tennessee.42 A 1996 Money magazine
investigation found that seventeen states and the District of Columbia are
"losing ground when it comes to protecting consumers.' 3 Money stated that
forty-four of the consumer offices it looked at had "seen their funding or
staffing slashed or eliminated altogether during the past decade."
The second structural barrier to consumer participation in the drafting
process is the three- to five-year time period for drafting revisions to a UCC
article.45 There is usually a study group process that precedes appointment of
a drafting committee. After a drafting committee is formed, it meets for about
three years. Both state consumer agencies and non-profit consumer groups
frequently experience levels of funding uncertainty that makes it extremely
difficult to commit to such a long process.
Rulemaking Process of Private Legislators, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 915-916 (1995).
41. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 595, 651 (1995); see also Corrine Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or
Who Is Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563 (1993); Kathleen Pachtel, Interest Group Politics,
Federalism, and the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78
MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993).
42. Dark Days for Consumer Agencies, CONSUMER REP., May 1993, at 312-14, available in
Westlaw, CONSUMER Database.
43. Ruth Simon, Losing Your Consumer Rights, MONEY, Mar. 1996, at 100, available in 1996
WL 8792785.
44. Id.
45. Schwarcz, supra note 40, at 918.
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The fact that meetings rotate throughout the country is a third barrier. If
meetings were consistently held in one location, it might be possible for a
local consumer advocate, law professor, household economics professor,
legal services attorney, or pro bono counsel to regularly attend meetings held
in his or her own city and present a consumer viewpoint.46 Because meetings
move about the country, this opportunity to develop a committed volunteer
consumer advocate is lost. Spreading the meetings throughout the country
might at first blush appear to be a way to maximize input. However, it does
not maximize input because the personal credibility that is developed over
time with continued participation is essential to effective advocacy in the
uniform law process. A single appearance has little effect in a three-year
process.
A fourth barrier to effective consumer participation in the uniform law
drafting process is the relatively specialized nature of UCC articles. The
substantive expertise necessary to advocate effectively in the Code revision
process is not widespread in the consumer movement. Many effective state
and local consumer agencies are staffed by non-lawyers, who are unlikely to
have training in the Commercial Code. Changes in highly technical Code
sections can have serious impacts on consumers, but those impacts can be
hard to see unless one has litigated or worked with the sections being altered.
Legal services attorneys can be invaluable sources of information about how
UCC sections work for consumer clients in practice, but many legal services
programs are no longer able to accept consumer cases.47
B. Lack of Practice Background in Consumer Issues by Decisionmakers
A key structural weakness in the UCC revision process is that the
practices of many of the NCCUSL members who serve on the drafting
committees do not provide those members with a full understanding of the
kind of conduct that is engaged in by companies dealing with consumers. The
ten- to fourteen-person drafting committees are composed primarily of
NCCUSL members, plus two or three ALI members. Unlike the ALI, the
46. When the Article 2 Consumer Issues Subcommittee met in Dallas, Texas, a representative
from the Better Business Bureau and a former attorney from the consumer unit of the Attorney
General's office joined them. Both enriched the debate but were unable to attend subsequent meetings
of the drafting committee held in far-away cities. Similarly, an attorney from Land of Lincoln Legal
Assistance attended an Article 9 drafting committee meeting which was held in Chicago.
47. David Barringer, Downsized Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 60.
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NCCUSL does not select its own membership. Instead, members are selected
by a political process in each state. NCCUSL members tend to be attorneys
with a commercial law practice, state legislators or legislative staff, plus some
academics and judges.
The UCC is a specialized topic. It should not be surprising therefore that
many of the nonlegislators who seek and secure appointments as Uniform
Law Commissioners have practices specializing in interpreting and applying
the Code for commercial clients. However, this concentration of practice
backgrounds among NCCUSL's nongovernmental employee members could
create a lack of perspective on how changes in the Code will affect
consumers. This is not to suggest that individuals volunteering their time to
the uniform law process are driven by their client's agendas. Rather, a
person's practice background, no less than life experiences, can affect how he
or she approaches a problem. Familiarity with the practices of a particular
industry can heighten sensitivity to the needs or arguments of that industry.
Members of the Conference also may be less likely than the average
consumer to have personal or practice experience with the segment of an
industry that most needs legal attention. Because of their social stratum,
Uniform Law Commissioners are probably less likely than the average
consumer to borrow from finance companies or buy from shady used car
dealers." The assumptions and experiences of decisionmakers can affect
policy choices by creating differing levels of receptivity to various arguments.
Here is an illustration. One issue that has arisen in connection with Articles 2,
2B, and 9 is the degree to which consumers should be expected to read and
understand all the terms in a standard form sales contract, license, or loan
note. A lawyer who regularly reads everything before signing may have a
different view on this topic than an ordinary consumer.49 A consumer whose
experience of the marketplace is that several entities are competing for his or
48. The Reporter for the Article 8 drafting committee has described the uniform law
commissioners as "an elite group," and as "prominent lawyers" chosen at least in part for "intellectual
interest in uniform law." James J. White, ExProprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2096-97 (1991).
Professor Jean Braucher has pointed out that an attorney with the reputation and abilities to be selected
as a Uniform Law Commissioner might be treated differently in his or her life as a consumer than a
middle class or working class consumer. Jean Braucher, The UCC Gets Another Rewrite, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1996, at 66.
49. Ninety million of the 191 million adults in the United States have literacy levels on a literacy
scale of one or two, meaning that they "were much less likely to respond correctly to the more
challenging literacy tasks in the assessment ... [such as] integrat[ing] or synthesizfing] information
from complex or lengthy texts." NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN
AMERICA, at xiv-xv (1993).
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her business may place a higher value on reading the contract than a
consumer who faces "take it or leave if' treatment from merchants and
lenders. In addition, some consumers have few alternatives because there are
no other stores in the neighborhood offering the product, there is no direct bus
service to the suburban mall, or there are no salespeople who speak the
consumer's language at other locations where the product is sold.
The Article 2 drafting committee seems to have avoided the weakness of a
narrow perspective in part through strong representation from academics and
in part because, as discussed below, Article 2 covers the kind of transactions
where there is some similarity in the marketplace for consumers from
differing economic classes. The thirteen-person Article 2 drafting committee
includes seven law professors, one state legislator, and five private
attorneys.50 One of the private attorneys is a retired in-house counsel, one is a
trial lawyer with a varied commercial and individual practice, and the
remaining three are from large- and medium-sized firms, practicing in the
areas of banking, consumer credit, commercial, corporate and insurance.5'
Two of the academic members of the Article 2 drafting committee also
serve on the Article 2B drafting committee, but the balance of the
membership of that committee differs sharply from that of the Article 2
committee. Slightly more than sixty percent (eight of thirteen) of the Article
2B drafting committee members are private attorneys with commercial
practices.52 Of these eight, six are with large- or medium-sized firms, one is
with a small-sized firm and one is a solo practitioner.53 These attorneys
practice in the areas of banking, commercial finance, bankruptcy, venture
capital, real estate, intellectual property, insurance defense and tax." The
remaining members of the Article 2B drafting committee are three law
professors and two attorneys employed by governmental entities.5 As
discussed above, and further in Part IH, these two sharply differing
committees have developed very different drafts.
50. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, preface. These statistics do not
include the committee reporters.
51. Representative clients of these attorneys' firms include Coopers & Lybrand, General Motors,
United Parcel Service, venture capitalists, and real estate developers. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY (1996).
52. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, preface. These statistics do not
include the committee reporter.
53. MARTINDALE-HUBB-LL LAW DIRECTORY (1996).
54. Representative clients of their firms include Pacific Bank, FDIC, Travelers Insurance, Honda,
AT&T, Anheuser-Busch, DuPont, Exxon, and General Motors. Id.
55. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, preface.
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The Article 9 drafting committee also lacks members who bring to the
drafting process a familiarity with the consumer perspective. Nine of its
twelve members are private attorneys or corporate counsel.56 The majority of
these attorneys practice with large or medium-sized firms, one is with a small
firm, one is a solo practitioner, and one is corporate counsel to a financial
group5 7 The remaining three members of the drafting committee are two law
professors and one bankruptcy judge." At its inception, the Article 9 drafting
committee did have a member who was a former consumer regulator,
however she resigned from the Conference.
There has been an ongoing public discussion in recent years about
whether members of law reform bodies can and do "check their clients at the
door." In four years of attending approximately twenty such drafting
committee meetings, this author has never seen a member of a UCC drafting
committee advocate a position for an individual client, but she has seen
committee members on at least one committee speak from experience with a
particular type of client. At the 1996 annual meeting, on the full floor of the
Conference, several Commissioners gave examples of how a provision would
affect a type of client. The flaw in the uniform law process perceived by this
author is not the use of the process to promote clients' interests. The problem,
instead, is both more subtle and more difficult to remedy. The problem is the
lack of sufficient practice exposure to, and understanding of, the problems
experienced by consumers under the Code.
The existence and severity of the problem of lack of familiarity with the
impact of the Code on consumers varies among the articles. This is partly
56. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, preface. These statistics do not
include the committee co-reporters. An analysis by practice background should not prove too much,
however. American Law Institute representative Donald Rapson, who is employed as a senior vice
president and associate general counsel of The CIT Group, Inc., a major creditor, has been an
outspoken proponent of solving one of the key failures of current Article 9: that it permits deficiencies
to be calculated based upon very low prices at disposition sales. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson,
Repurchase (of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficiency Actions: What Does
Section 9-504(5) Mean?. 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649 (1992-93).
57. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1996).
58. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, preface.
59. Other drafting committees for recently completed UCC revisions have also had many
corporate attorneys in their membership. Of the eight members of the Article 3 & 4 drafling
committee, five were private attorneys who represent corporate interests in their practices. They
included a corporate counsel for a financial group, plus four attorneys from large- and medium-sized
firms with practice areas in commercial law, banking, tax, real estate, antitrust, creditors' rights,
bankruptcy, insurance, and mergers and acquisitions. The remaining members included one judge and
two law professors.
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because different articles cover differing degrees of market segmentation in
markets serving consumers. For example, although the Article 2 drafting
committee does not contain any professionals who specialize in representing
consumers in their purchase of goods,6" the members of that committee, as
individual consumers, probably deal with a broad range of the spectrum of
sellers of goods.6' There is a risk in assuming that the combined experiences
of Uniform Law Commissioners and other drafters as consumers reflect the
broad experience of U.S. consumers. Having an attorney or any other
articulate, persistent advocate in the family can be of great assistance in
resolving difficulties with a merchant or a manufacturer. The relatively
affluent economic group from which Uniform Law Commissioners are drawn
may have very different experiences as consumers than the average full-time
U.S. worker, whose annual household income is $47,012 for a family of
four.62 However, the members of the Article 2 drafting committee probably
get their groceries from the same chain supermarkets which serve all but the
poorest Americans.6"
The Article 9 drafting committee members, by contrast, probably have no
personal experience in the credit market faced by poor and working class
Americans. Segmentation of the credit market means that the personal
experiences of the Article 9 drafting committee members as consumers are
likely to differ sharply from the experiences of other credit consumers. Low
income and working-class consumers frequently participate in a different
segment of the credit market than middle and upper-middle income
consumers. Consumers with the highest incomes are often served by private
bankers,' whose economic incentive to maintain the entire business
relationship with the client may create a tendency to offer favorable terms and
conditions on a personal loan. Upper income and upper-middle income
consumers not at the private banking level are served by banks and frequently
many banks compete for their business. Lower income consumers, including
60. One Commissioner's practice, however, includes this as part of a general practice.
61. They may be unlikely to have personally experienced the lower end of the distribution
system, however.
62. U.S. Census Bureau, The Official Statistics, 1994 U.S. Median Income for 4-Person Families,
by State (visited Aug. 13, 1996) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html>.
63. For a discussion of the degree to which poorer neighborhoods may lack basic retail services
such as chain grocery stores, see DAVID DANTE TROUT, THE THIN RED LINE: How THE POOR STILL
PAY MORE (W. Coast Reg. Office, Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. 1993).
64. Peter Sinton, Banking on the Rich, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 1996, at Cl, available in 1996 WL
3224300.
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families trying to survive on one or two full-time, minimum-wage salaries,
face a different credit market. Finance companies are a more common source
of credit for lower income consumers. The business practices of some of
these entities are quite different than those of banks. To a much larger extent,
credit is "sold, not bought., 61 If the members of a drafting committee have not
been exposed to the practices in a subpart of the market, either through their
law practices or as individual consumers, this creates a special challenge to
the development of sound policy affecting this subpart of the market.
C. Heavy Participation by Industry Observers Can Affect the Dynamics of
a UCC Drafting Committee's Discussion
A key structural barrier to development of UCC articles which fully and
fairly consider and address consumer transactions is the likelihood that there
will be an industry or group of industries which has much more at stake than
other affected parties. This barrier is greater in connection with those articles
that centrally affect one or a small group of industries. It can also occur when
two types of commercial parties would be affected, but only one of those
types of parties is organized. Finally, this barrier is found where an issue is
central to the business of a party on one side of a transaction while peripheral
to the business of the other. Article 9 is an example. Both commercial
borrowers and commercial creditors will be affected by the changes to Article
9 to a degree at least as great as the impact of the draft on consumer
borrowers. The commercial credit industry is built around the function of
providing credit, and Article 9 is a central statute affecting that activity. By
contrast, commercial borrowers' businesses are built around their specific
industries, not around their role as credit-seeking entities.
This type of imbalance in the degree of attention paid to drafting of legal
changes by different parties to affected transactions can lead to different
levels of participation, which can skew the process. The centrally affected
industry may send many participants to the drafting process, with a shared
viewpoint on key issues. The many other groups which are less directly
impacted by the changes may be less completely represented. The most
directly affected industry may also exert pressure through express or implied
threats that revisions unacceptable to it will not be enacted.
65. See infra Part 11I.C.10 (discussing the degree to which assumptions made by the Article 9
drafting committee grounded in the markets for commercial credit and middle- and upper-income
consumer credit are not true in the credit market faced by lower-income consumers).
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The impact of strong interest in uniform law changes by a particular
industry can be magnified by the role which observers play in the UCC
drafting process. Observers attend drafting committee meetings, usually
receiving full speaking privileges. In many of the drafting committee
meetings this author has attended, observers were regularly invited to
participate in a "sense of the room" straw vote before the drafting committee
voted on qt particular provision.
The observers to the Articles 2, 2B and 9 drafting committees are
overwhelmingly representatives of or outside counsel to affected industries.
Almost sixty percent (forty-nine of eighty-two) of the Article 9 observers on
its July 1994 observer list have practices representing corporate interests.66
This group includes ten observers from business and industry (including Ford
Motor Credit, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Household
International, and Associates Financial); six from financial institutions or their
trade groups (including the American Bankers Association, the California
Bankers Association, Citicorp Mortgage, and the Bank of Oklahoma);
twenty-three corporate attorneys from large- or medium-sized firms (with
firm practice areas including secured transactions, bankruptcy, real estate,
creditors' rights, municipal financing, taxation and banking);67 and ten
attorneys from small-sized firms (with practice areas such as bankruptcy,
corporate finance, creditors' rights, securities, real estate, banking and
taxation).6 Only twenty-three percent (nineteen of eighty-two) of the
observers on the July 1994 Article 9 observers list were employed by entities
that could be classified as neutral.69 Twelve are law professors, two are from
66. 1994 Article 9 Observers List (on file with author). The list of observers tends to expand as a
drafting effort proceeds. Lists from relatively early periods in the life of both the Article 2 and 9
drafting committees have been analyzed, in part because of the author's observation that early and
sustained participation is the most effective way to participate in the drafting process.
67. Representative firm clients include Bank of America, Boeing, Coca Cola, Continental
Airlines, General Motors, Lloyds of London, Merrill Lynch, AMC Entertainment, Brown &
Williamson Tobacco, Johnson & Johnson, Phillip Morris, Texaco, Clorox, Bristol Myers Squibb,
Digital Equipment Corp., E. and J. Gallo Winery, Marriott International, MCI, Safeway and
Westinghouse. MARTtNDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECToRY (1996).
68. Representative firm clients include Bank of Jackson Hole, Nimrod Natural Gas, Fireman's
Fund, Dun & Bradstreet, New England Mutual Life Insurance, Maryland Lumber, Resolution Trust
Corp., National Auto Auction Association, United Services Automobile Association, Wal-Mart,
AT&T Capital and General Electric Capital. Id.
69. In this analysis, attorneys were characterized as having corporate practices if they had
practice areas of antitrust, bankruptcy, commercial, creditors' tights, finance, insurance, mergers and
acquisitions, real estate, securities, taxation, and venture capital. One is classified as neutral if he or she
represents a quasi-governmental law reform organization, bar association, government agency, or is a
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the American Law Institute, two are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and three are from state law revision commissions.
Less than ten percent (seven of eighty-two) of the observers on that
Article 9 observers list could be classified as "consumer-friendly., 71 One
observer is from the consumer/antitrust division of a state attorney general's
office; two are attorneys with a small-sized firm or solo practice (practice
areas include class action, consumer protection, shareholder litigation, and
debt collection abuse); and four are with public interest organizations. 7' The
remaining nine percent of observers (seven of eighty-two) include two
drafting committee chairs from other UCC articles, three reporters from other
UCC articles or restatements, and two observers for whom there was no
available information.
72
The observers to the Article 2 process also are primarily from affected
industries, with the important distinction that those industries are affected in
their roles as both buyers and sellers. Of the thirty-five individuals on the
Article 2 observer list as of September 30, 1992, approximately sixty-six
percent (twenty-three of thirty-five) represented commercial interests in their
practices, twenty percent (seven of thirty-five) fell in the neutral category,
eleven percent (four of thirty-five) could be categorized as consumer-friendly,
and one could not be categorized.73
Of the Article 2 observers representing corporate interests, the
overwhelming majority (nineteen of twenty-three) represented business and
industry (e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, IBM, Chrysler, Mobile
Oil, Microsoft, National Electrical Manufacturers Association).74 One
observer represented a financial institution (American Bankers Association)
and three were attorneys with corporate practices.75 The seven neutral
law professor, judge or ALl representative with no other known affiliation. The term "consumer-
friendly" is used to describe attorneys with practice areas of consumer protection, shareholder
litigation, debt collection abuse, legal services, and employees of consumer rights organizations.
70. See supra note 66.
71. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1996).
72. These observers had no Martindale-Hubbell listing or the listing stated the address only.
73. See Sept. 30, 1992 Article 2 Observers List (on file with author); MARTINDALE-HUBBELL
LAWDIRECTORY (1996).
74. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1996).
75. Listed practice areas of these attorneys include corporate, high technology and commercial.
Id. Representative clients of the firms of these attorneys included Aetna Life & Casualty, Black &
Decker, Citizens Bank of Maryland, Lloyds of London, Royal Globe Insurance, Bank One of
Columbus, Physicians Health Plan, Honda Federal Credit Union and John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance. Id.
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observers included three law professors, three from quasi-governmental law
reform organizations, and one from the American Law Institute. Of the four
observers representing consumer interests, three represented consumer
organizations (two from Consumers Union and one from National Consumer
Law Center), and one represented a union legal services plan. Not all of these
persons, however, were able to attend even one drafting committee meeting.
The observers to the Article 2B drafting committee's work also are
dominated by industry. According to a mailing list provided by the
Conference at one point in the process, two-thirds of the observers (twenty-
six of thirty-six) represent industry or corporate interests. Nine observers
represented business and industry (e.g., the Software Industry Coalition,
Business Software Alliance, Software Publishers Association, Hewlett-
Packard, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Recreation Vehicle Industry
Association, Caterpillar Incorporated, and Siemens Corporation) and fifteen
were private attorneys representing corporate interests (practice areas include
banking, antitrust, bankruptcy, copyright, trademark, telecommunications,
and technology transfers).76
This imbalance of participation can create a climate in which a persistent
consumer advocate raising issues at each point where the draft affects
consumers will appear to be a nuisance to the process, merely because the
comments all come from one person. An industry represented by multiple
observers can divide its issues among its advocates so that no one advocate
appears to be seeking too many changes to the draft. One participant who
attempted to interject consumer issues into the debate about Articles 3 and 4
has written eloquently of the difficulties of raising consumer issues in a forum
in which the participants are not familiar with or receptive to the issues."
An imbalance in the level of participation between commercial and
consumer representatives could also lead a draffing committee or the full
Conference and the ALI to the mistaken impression that the impact of
changes in law on commercial parties will be of more importance in the
enactment process in state legislatures than any harm that might be done to
76. Representative clients of these attorneys include Microsoft, the American Council of Life
Insurance, General Motors, Dime Savings Bank, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing, Proctor & Gamble,
Foundation Press, West Publishing, General Electric Capital, Merrill Lynch, and USX). Two observers
are corporate counsel for a financial group. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1996). The
pool of observers is constantly shifting making any analysis of these lists necessarily of the snapshot
variety.
77. Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the
Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4,26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993).
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consumers.78 The recent experience with uniform law proposals such as UCC
Articles 3 and 4 contradicts this assumption. As discussed in more detail in
Part IV, several state legislatures and the highly respected New York Law
Revision Commission found Articles 3 and 4 to be inadequate with respect to
consumers and made or recommended nonuniform changes. UCC Articles
2B and 9 could face a similar fate in the state legislatures if care is not taken
now to evaluate how they will affect consumers.
D. Policy Implications of the Structural Barriers to Consumer
Participation in the UCC Revision Process
Because of the intractability of the structural barriers, the Conference and
the ALI have an increased obligation to evaluate the impact of proposed UCC
changes on consumers. It is not yet clear how well these bodies will rise to
that responsibility. In the summer of 1995, the scope and program committee
of the Conference recommended removing from the jurisdiction of the
78. Concerns about undue influence of affected industries are as old as the Code itself. The issue
of whether the Code is a fair and balanced product for consumers is not new. The original Article 4
was criticized as "a deliberate sell-out of the American Law Institute and the Commission of Uniform
Laws to the bank lobby." Fredrick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should
Not be Adopted, 61 YALE L.L 335, 362 (1952). Grant Gilmore reported in 1951 that critics of the
original Article 9 asserted that it "removes most of the restrictions and limitations on lender's
operations which have grown up over a century of common law and under statute." Grant Gilmore,
The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 34
(1951). Participants in the original Article 9 process suggested that the interests of the credit industry
in that drafting process resulted in a draft which was skewed in favor of the industry. Id. at 34-37.
Robert E. Scott stated that the desires of the financial community strongly influenced the original
Article 9. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 41, at 638. Scott described the original Article 9 as the creation
of an "interest-group-dominated study group." Id. at 639.
The early drafts of existing Article 9 contained far more extensive consumer transaction
provisions than the final draft. Grant Gilmore's writings suggest that the scaling back was partly
because of political reality. He stated in 1951:
By its nature Article 9 cannot become a matter of any great public interest-although there is a
certain amount of fun in imagining the Governor of Connecticut or of North Carolina running for
re-election on the issues of the after-acquired property clause and the floating charge. It is a
technical statute for specialists. Unfortunately all the specialists are on the same team and there is
no opposition. Financing operations in this field have become so complex that no one, except the
operating men and their counsel, any longer understands them. It is a fair guess that at legislative
hearings, apart from the local Commissioners on Uniform Laws, no one will show up except bank
and finance company counsel, appearing either in that capacity or as representatives of local, state
and national bar associations. To the extent that the passage or defeat of legislation depends on
rational grounds, Article 9 will pass or fail depending on the attitude to be taken by the
representatives of the financing industry.
Gilmore, supra, at 48.
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Articles 2, 2B and 9 draffing committees any consideration of the impact of
their actions on consumer transactions. The Executive Committee of the
Conference rejected that recommendation and instead directed each drafting
committee to create a Consumer Issues Subcommittee that would make a
recommendation to the drafting committee and to the NCCUSL's Executive
Committee the following summer on whether and how consumer issues
should be treated in the Code.
Those subcommittees met extensively. They provided a forum for
discussion of important issues, but they also constituted an additional hurdle
to those trying to improve the Code in ways that might benefit consumers.
Although the subcommittees worked hard to understand the issues and
ultimately make sound recommendations, additional meeting days, including
additional staff time and travel expense, were required of consumer and
industry representatives to participate effectively in the process. The
Consumer Issues Subcommittee process also created an additional hurdle for
proposals simply to retain current law for consumers in the face of a change
being made for commercial transactions. Ultimately, both the Article 2 and
the Article 9 subcommittees recommended that their respective acts include
provisions addressing consumer issues." The Conference's scope and
program committees also recommended that Articles 2 and 9 address
consumer issues and its Executive Committee adopted resolutions to that
effect." As the discussion of the substantive decisions made by the drafting
committees to date shows, however, it remains to be seen whether the
uniform law drafting process will result in a fair and workable UCC Article 9
for consumer secured transactions.
III. POLICY ISSUES FOR CONSUMERS IN ARTICLES 2, 2B, AND 9
A. Article 2
1. Reasons Why Articles 2 and 9 Should Address Consumer Issues
Some of those who have opposed improvements in Article 2 for
consumers have argued that Article 2 need not be concerned with providing
79. The Article 2B drafting committee did not form a Consumer Issues Subcommittee,
apparently because of its decision to draw a line not between consumer and nonconsumer transactions,
but instead between small and large transactions. See infra Part III.B.
80. Executive Committee Resolution, July 1996 (on file with author).
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rules that work in consumer sales because other state and federal laws address
the sale of goods to consumers. Those other laws, however, do not eliminate
the need for Article 2 to address consumer contracts for the sale of goods. As
described by an American Bar Association ("ABA") Task Force on Article 2,
the Federal Magnuson-Moss Act is "in most respects a disclosure statute."'"
The state lemon laws also are not comprehensive laws for the sale of
consumer goods.82 Lemon laws are limited to vehicles, usually new
vehicles." They address remedies after breach of warranty, not other basic
Article 2 issues such as contract formation.84 As the ABA Task Force
concluded, "There is not available a viable package of non-U.C.C. law to
resolve consumer sales law problems.""
While Article 2 will not address all the issues in the sale of goods to
consumers, it can and should address basic contract formation issues such as
when terms in a standard form contract are effective, what promises become
part of the bargain, and how the basic warranty of merchantability can be
disclaimed. Indeed, if Article 2 does not address these issues directly, courts
are likely to bend the statutory language which it does contain to do so
indirectly. The American Bar Association's Task Force has pointed out that a
failure to include rules for consumer sales in Article 2 would be likely to lead
courts to reinterpret the general rules for consumer transactions, undermining
uniformity and certainty for commercial transactions.8 6
Similarly, the existence of other laws does not eliminate the need for
Article 9 to be designed to work properly in those consumer transactions
which it reaches. There is no body of federal law which governs repossession
and post-repossession conduct of creditors. The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, for example, governs only collection activity of third-party
collectors, not the conduct of parties acting to collect debts owed to them.87
The Federal Truth in Lending Act is mainly a disclosure statute, not one
which restricts the substantive conduct of the creditor with respect to a debt
81. Task Force of the A.B.A., Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the
March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 981, 1003 (1991) [hereinafter ABA, Appraisal].
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1002-03.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e), 1692a(6) (1994).
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secured by personal property.8 Some states have adopted the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code ("UCCC"), but many have not. 9 The Federal Trade
Commission's Credit Practices Rule does contain certain restrictions on
conduct, but it was expressly intended not to occupy the field.9" Instead, it
was written with the backdrop of state laws, including the Uniform
Commercial Code, as a fundamental assumption.9
It is worthwhile to observe that the UCC already recognizes that consumer
transactions can call for different rules than commercial transactions. Existing
section 2-719(3) dealing with the limitation of consequential damages for
personal injury, applies only to consumer goods.9 2 Section 2-318 extends
warranties by referring to the family or household of a buyer who is a natural
person.93 Section 9-109(1) defines consumer goods as those "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes. '94 Section 9-
204(2) limits the effectiveness of an after-acquired property clause in
consumer goods, but not in other types of goods.95 Section 9-307(2) provides
that a consumer buyer of consumer goods takes the goods free of certain
security interests of which he or she was unaware.96 Section 9-505(1)
prohibits strict foreclosure of consumer goods collateral where sixty percent
has been paid and recognizes potential conversion liability for failure to
dispose of these goods promptly.9 Section 9-507(1) creates damages where
the collateral is consumer goods amounting to the credit service charge plus
ten percent of the cash price.98
88. Id. § 1601(a).
89. Seven states have adopted some form of the 1968 draft of the UCCC. These states are
Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming. KEvIN W. BRowN &
KATHLEEN E. KEEST, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION § 2.3.3.9 (1987). Four states have
adopted a form of the 1974 draft. These states are Idaho, Iowa, Kansas and Maine. Id.
90. 49 Fed. Reg. 7740,7783 (1984).
91. Id.
92. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1995).
93. a § 2-318.
94. Id § 9-109(1).
95. Id § 9-204(2).
96. Id § 9-307(2).
97. Id § 9-505(l).
98. Id § 9-507(1). Some creditors have argued that because they are not asking for changes to
current Article 9, no new provisions beneficial to consumers should be added. While it is interesting
that some creditors are satisfied with current Article 9, what is under discussion by the drafting
committee is very different than current Article 9. The new Article 9 draft moves quite far toward
making the legal rules even more friendly to creditors than current Article 9. For example, it adds new
safe harbors, permits partial strict foreclosure, and codifies a definition of purchase money security
interest as continuing after a refinance. That definition is now left to the courts. Those very changes in
Washington University Open Scholarship
96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
2. Improvements for Consumers in the Article 2 Draft
a. Treatment of Standard Form Contracts, Section 2-206
The Article 2 draft takes a critically important step forward by proposing
language to address standard form contracts. This is an appropriate subject for
the UCC. The basic design of the Uniform Commercial Code assumes that
contract language reflects the mutual desires of the parties. A primary role of
the Code has been to honor the choices of the parties, filling in with default
rules where the parties have not made a mutual choice of a term.99 The Code
paradigm of the bargained-for transaction, however, does not reflect actual
contracting practices in consumer transactions or in many other types of
transactions where standard form contracts are widely used. For this reason,
the ABA Task Force on Article 2 recommended in 1991 that the Article 2
drafting process "try to deal in a statutory way with the adhesion contract."' 00
Existing Article 2 recognizes that preprinted documents prepared by one
party may not truly reflect the actual bargain of the parties. Current section 2-
207 addresses the effect of preprinted forms when they are exchanged
between parties.'0 ' The Article 2 draft extends this concept by adding section
2-206 on the effect of preprinted forms prepared by a single party.0 2 This
section recognizes the widespread use of standard form contracts and
provides a straightforward rule for determining when unagreed-to terms that
contained in a standard form and become part of a contract.'0 3
Article 2 already recognizes that terms drafted by one party will not
necessarily reflect a mutual agreement of the parties. Comment I to section 2-
207 states in part "because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the
respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not
correspond.""' Comment 5 to section 2-207 further explains that the types of
clauses that should be treated as part of the contract of the parties, unless
notice of objection is given, are clauses which "involve no element of
the new Article 9 draft make the inclusion of separate consumer rules essential to preserve some
elements of current law for consumers, and to rebalance the statute for consumers in light of the many
other changes being made to it.
99. U.C.c. § 1-102 & cmt. (1995).
100. ABA, Appraisal, supra note 81, at 1005.
101. U.C.C. § 2-207 & cmts. (1995).
102. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-206 & notes.
103. Id. This draft section is discussed at length in a piece in this symposium. Michael M.
Greenfield, The Role ofAssent in Article 2 and Article 9,75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289 (1997).
104. U.C.C § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1995).
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unreasonable surprise."' 5
Draft section 2-206 takes the concept of unfair surprise which underlies
existing section 2-207 and adapts it for use in standard form contracts,
including consumer contracts.' 6 This essential section provides some
protection against unexpected terms without prohibiting standard form
contracts and without specifying or limiting the types of terms that can be
included in those forms.
It is essential that Article 2 treat the effect of terms in a standard form
contract. A consumer does not draft the terms of the standard form and cannot
change them. Even the person with whom the consumer deals usually lacks
the authority to vary the terms of the printed contract. In transactions where
the price is subject to bargaining, such as in a car sale, the consumer still has
no ability to bargain over other contractual language. Indeed, bargaining over
price could create the impression that the deal has been concluded when the
price is settled and that the standard form contract is merely implementing
"paperwork," rather than the true bargain of the parties.
Draft section 2-206 addresses these contracting realities in a manner
which is consistent with the principles of the Code. It fully honors any actual
agreement of the parties because terms which the consumer could not
reasonably have expected can also become part of the contract upon express
agreement.0 7 The section also implements all terms of a standard form
contract which were never discussed by the parties, as long as those terms
could reasonably have been expected by the consumer.
The approach of draft section 2-206 is fully consistent with the purpose of
existing Code section 2-207 which is to prevent unreasonable surprise.' The
draft is also consistent with international legal principles. The draft is in part
based on Article 2.20 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts."°  That international principle of contract law
validates standard terms only if they could reasonably have been expected."0
Draft section 2-206 will not introduce a new source of uncertainty in
ascertaining the terms of the parties' agreement. The Code already recognizes
105. U.C.C § 2-207 cmt. 5 (1995).
106. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-206 note 1.
107. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-206.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
109. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-206 Note 4.
110. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts art. 2.20 (1994)(visited Oct
23, 1996) <http://itl.irv.uit.no/tade-law/documents...xtunidroit-prinipes.compete.htm#NR34>.
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that the question of what the parties have agreed to is a question of fact.
Article 1 defines agreement to be the bargain in fact of the parties as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances."' Comment 3 to
section 1-201 states that the definition of agreement is intended to include not
only course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade, but also
"the surrounding circumstances."'
1 2
Draft section 2-206 would place no limits on the types of proof that a
seller may offer to show that a term reasonably could have been expected.
The nature of the transaction, the price of the product, oral or written
disclosures, and the custom and practice in the industry might all be sources
of evidence tending to show that a term could reasonably have been expected.
The section also directs the courts to examine the content, language and
presentation of the standard form and the term.
One of the key differences between the Article 2 and 2B drafts has been
Article 2's selection of the expectations of the reasonable consumer in the
position of this consumer. The Article 2B draft chooses a different standard.
Article 2B selects the standard of what a reasonable seller would have
thought that a reasonable consumer expected. The reasonable objective
consumer standard of the Article 2 draft is more appropriate than the
reasonable objective seller standard of the Article 2B draft. A standard which
relies upon what a seller or licensor expected consumers to think is subject to
manipulation. One can easily imagine a seller or licensor who might, for
example, fund a biased study on what consumers expect, and then argue that
it relied upon that study in including terms in a standard form contract. If a
seller cannot prove that a reasonable consumer would have expected the term,
it should not be enough to prove that the seller thought that a consumer would
have expected a term.
Draft section 2-206 will validate the use of many terms found in standard
forms for the sale of goods. At the same time, it will prevent the perversion of
contract theory by refusing to permit standard forms to impose surprising
terms on a consumer when those terms were never part of the bargain in fact.
It is a critical step forward for Article 2. Its presence in the draft contradicts, at
least for the Article 2 process, worries about potential "capture" of the
drafting process by powerful commercial interests.
111. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995).
112. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 3 (1995).
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b. Treatment of Express Warranties by Remote Sellers, Section 2-
405
Draft section 2-404 (formerly section 2-313) addresses express warranties
made to the public by remote sellers." 3 This section recognizes that the
realities of modem commerce often do not fit the UCC paradigm of a two-
party, face-to-face transaction. Affirmations of fact and promises by sellers
which are not puffing frequently create express warranties under current
Article 2 if they are made by a direct seller."4 However, remote and
intermediate sellers distribute many consumer goods. A manufacturer or other
remote seller may make affirmations of fact or promises about the goods in
order to induce consumers to buy those goods from an intermediate seller.
For this reason, the ABA Task Force recommended that "the drafting should
be broad enough to encompass representations in advertising which are
broadly addressed to the public."' 5 Draft section 2-405 addresses that goal.
Draft section 2-405 permits consumers and other buyers to enforce
advertised affirmations of fact or promises about the goods when certain
conditions are met. First, the advertising must contain an affirmation of fact,
promise, description, or sample or model which became part of the
agreement." 6 The advertisement is not enforced if a reasonable person in the
buyer's position would believe that the affirmation of fact or promise did not
become part of the agreement." 7 Even if a reasonable person in the buyer's
position would believed concluded that the affirmation of fact or promise
became part of the agreement, the remote seller may still escape responsibility
for its promise by establishing that it was puffing."
8
Draft section 2-404 recognizes that advertising by remote sellers can
create legitimate consumer expectations. Manufacturers make affirmations of
fact or promises in their advertising in order to influence consumers to
purchase their goods. When the advertising succeeds and the consumer buys
the product, that buyer should be able to enforce those affirmations which
113. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-404.
114. U.C.C. § 313 (1995).
115. ABA, Appraisal, supra note 8 1, at 1104.
116. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2404(b).
117. Id. § 2-404(a).
118. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199..) § 2-405(c) & note 4 (Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State laws, Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Nov. 1996 Draft, Art. 2],
available at <http:/www.law.upenn.eduflibrary/ulelule.htm> (visited on Jan. 10, 1997).
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
exceed puffing against the party who made them. As one commentator has
stated:
There is clearly something incongruous about a manufacturer or other
remote seller advertising or otherwise promoting his products in
language that rises to the level of an affirmation of the quality of the
goods, and then taking the position that claimants who relied on those
affirmations, at least in part, in selecting those goods cannot assert a
warranty claim because of a lack of privity.'"
9
Draft section 2-404 should not deter truthful advertising. A manufacturer
will not incur liability under the section if its product lives up to advertised
promises and affirmations of fact. If the advertising is truthful, the only effect
of section 2-404 should be to allocate the risk to the remote seller of an
occasional unit which does not live up to the remote seller's advertised
affirmations or promises, rather than to the consumer who bought the bad
unit Untruthful advertising may be deterred, to the benefit of both consumers
and of more responsible sellers and advertisers.
Section 2-404 was significantly narrowed after its initial debut in the draft.
As previously stated, the section clearly preserves puffing as a defense. It
restricts the express warranty to those buyers influenced by the advertisement,
rather than to all persons to whom the ad was directed. 2 Finally, the draft
restricts the express warranty solely to those for whom it has become part of
the bargain. The draft excludes statements from the bargain if a reasonable
buyer would not have believed that those statements were part of the
bargain.' Although more limited than earlier versions, this section takes a
useful step by eliminating the need to litigate privity when enforcing promises
a remote seller makes to the public about its own goods.'
119. GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
11.15[1][b] (1981).
120. There are sound theoretical reasons why this restriction should not have been included.
Consumers who buy mass-marketed goods generally pay the same price whether or not they were
aware of a particular advertised promise. If the cost of compliance with the promise is built into the
cost of the product, why should only those who learned of the promise be able to enforce it? For a
discussion of some of these issues, see Donald F. Clifford, Issues, Answers and Some Questions
Relating to Revised 2-313, 2-316, and 2-318, in COM. L. ANN. 89, 109 (Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick
Del Duca eds., 1995) (citing Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from
Express Warranties: "Real-World" Consumers Don't Read Warranties, 45 S.C. L. REV. 429, 468-470
(1994)).
121. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2404(c).
122. Id. § 2-404.
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c. Disclaimer of the Implied Warranty ofMerchantibility, Section
2-408(c)
The Article 2 draft also contains an important provision in section 2-
407(c)." The draft section recognizes that a sale of goods to a consumer
which lacks the basic implied warranty that the goods are merchantable is,
and should be, an unusual transaction."4 The implied warranty of
merchantability is the fundamental warranty that the product will do what
products of that type, appearance, age and condition should do.'25 A
disclaimer of this warranty is an extraordinary disclaimer-it means that the
consumer is buying goods that need not work at all. Doubts about whether
there was an agreement to eliminate merchantability should be resolved
against the disclaimer because consumers are unlikely to want or expect
unmerchantable goods.
As Professor Donald Clifford has pointed out, disclaimers seriously impair
reasonable consumer expectations:
Consumers generally do not perceive that they have the power to
bargain over disclaimers, especially when printed standard forms are
used. Where the warranties and disclaimers come from a remote seller,
there is not even anyone the consumer may bargain with since the
remote seller provides [that] the immediate seller has no power to alter
the terms of the remote seller warranty.1
6
Many states have addressed the surprising nature of disclaimers of the
implied warranty of merchantability directly by making these disclaimers
inoperable. 7 The Article 2 draft takes a less complete but also less effective
approach. The draft does not prohibit disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability. It does not render all disclaimers inoperable. Instead, draft
section 2-407(c) permits the parties to agree on a disclaimer of this most
fundamental warranty. 128 At the same time, the provision attempts to reduce
the likelihood of unfair surprise by requiring that the agreement to the
123. Id, § 2-407(c).
124. Id. § 2-407(c) & note 3.
125. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(f) (1995).
126. Memorandum from Donald F. Clifford to Subcommittee on Consumers Issues of the Article
2 Drafting Committee 6 (Jan. 1, 1996) (on file with the author).
127. Donald F. Clifford, Jr., Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and
Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1021 (1993).
128. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-407(c).
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disclaimer be a real, "express" agreement.'29 It does so by recognizing
disclaimers in consumer contracts only where the disclaimer was expressly
agreed. Unfortunately, however, the drafting committee at its March 1997
meeting voted to further weaken this standard. The final text remains
unknown.
Draft section 2-407(c) would replace the portion of existing section 2-316
which permits disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability by the
use of conspicuous terms such as "as is" or "with all faults. '' 130 This change is
needed because terms such as "as is" cannot ensure that a disclaimer
accurately reflects the actual bargain of the parties. A simple disclaimer does
not communicate how completely a product may fail to meet its description if
there is no implied warranty of merchantability.
As long ago as the late 1970s it was known that a significant number of
consumers do not comprehend the full implications of "as is." A 1978 Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission describes three studies that tested
consumer understanding of the term "as is."'' Data from two surveys
covering used car buyers in twenty-three states revealed that as many as
twenty-five percent of the respondents could not identify a correct description
of an "as is" sale.'32 Many used car buyers also did not understand that "as is"
meant that the buyer would bear all repair costs.'33 Between thirty-six percent
and fifty-nine percent of consumers in another study mistakenly believed that
the seller would bear all or part of any repair costs incurred within twenty-five
days after an "as is" sale.'34
Evidence in the same record showed that consumers attributed specific,
but incorrect meanings to the term "as is." Some consumers equated "as is"
in a car sale with the description "as the car appears to be."'35 These
consumers applied "as is" only to visible or known defects (e.g, body rust or
dents). 36 Other buyers believed that "as is" referred to the accessories already
installed in the vehicle, such as the radio, air conditioning, power steering or
129. Id. This section, however, is still under discussion by the drafting committee and firther
changes may be made.
130. Id. § 2407(b)(1).
131. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SALE OF USED MOTOR
VEHICLES: FINAL STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE
REGULATION RULE (16 CFR PART 455) 262-63 (1978).
132. Id. at262.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 263.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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power brakes. 137 A third set of buyers perceived "as is" to mean that the
goods would not be conditioned or prepared before delivery. 3 Consumers
may understand terms such as "as is" to mean that goods are less than perfect,
but not necessarily that the goods are altogether unmerchantable.
Another reason why a pure disclaimer approach is not adequate under
Article 2 is that requiring a disclaimer without an actual agreement permits
the seller to provide the disclaimer at a time in the transaction where it has
little meaning. Disclosures are not likely to be effective when made after the
true deal has been completed by the parties.139 One scholar, discussing the
need for timeliness in disclosures, has stated: "This notion casts doubt on the
effectiveness of any disclosure requirement in which the information is only
presented after the effective agreement-the oral agreement-is
concluded."' 40 This is directly relevant to disclaimers of the implied warranty
of merchantability. It can be difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer to
determine the precise terms of the warranty prior to purchase. 4' A warranty
document is often sealed in a package designed to protect against damage and
pilferage. Sales clerks are unlikely to agree to open a package to produce the
warranty before the sale.'42 An "express agreement" standard such as that
found in section 2-407(c) of the January 1997 Article 2 draft could encourage
sellers to make warranty limits known at a time when it is meaningful-prior
to the consumer expressly agreeing to the disclaimer.
The disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability provision in
current Article 2 is inadequate to assure that disclaimers actually reflect the
bargain in fact of the parties. The "express agreement" standard of draft
137. Id.
138. Id. at 264-65.
139. Griffith L. Garwood et al., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 777,
781-83 (1993) (discussing prerequisites for effective disclosure in consumer financial services).
140. George S. Day, Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements, J. MKTG.,
Apr. 1976, at 42, 47 (citing William C. Whitford, Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400,443).
141. Laurence P. Feldman, New Legislation and the Prospects for Real Warranty Reform, J.
MKTG., July 1976, at 41, 42.
142. Id. Feldman states:
Two researchers, who spent a month shopping in an attempt to compare written warranties for
various products, were frequently told by salesclerks that they could not see the warranty in
advance of purchase because the opened package would suggest to subsequent buyers that the item
had been purchased and returned.
Id. (citing Consumer Warranty Protection: Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 101
(1973)).
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section 2-408(c) attempts to accomplish that goal. Some have asserted that
section 2-408(c) will make it hard to eliminate an implied warranty of
merchantability.'43 It would be more accurate to say that it will make it hard
to eliminate the warranty without the knowledge or consent of the consumer.
However, the draft also permits a seller broad leeway to prove and enforce an
actual agreement that the sale is to proceed without the warranty.
3. The Article 2 Draft Still Needs Strong Restrictions on Variation by
Agreement of Its Pro-Consumer Provisions
The Article 2 draft has a number of provisions that will be helpful to
consumers, but are unlikely to have any impact if they can be waived by
standard form contracts. These provisions include section 2-105 on
unconscionability; section 2-206 on standard form contracts; sections 2-403
through 2-405 concerning warranties; section 2-408(c) on disclaimer of
warranties; section 2-810 on minimum adequate remedies and failure of
essential purpose; and section 2-809 (formerly 2-709) on liquidated damages.
Earlier versions of the Article 2 draft provided that certain provisions
could not be varied by agreement. The style committee recommended
deleting the list of nonvariable provisions from section 2-110. The section
was deleted. Not all of the needed restrictions on waiver were redistributed
throughout the draft, and it is not clear what further restrictions on waiver are
contemplated. In particular, section 2-206 on standard form contracts does not
yet contain a prohibition on waiver. That section and others which benefit
consumers will have little meaning if they can be varied by agreement.
It has been suggested that restrictions on waiver are unnecessary because
of existence of section 1-102. However, section 1-102 does not prevent
waiver of remedies, but only waivers of good faith, reasonableness, diligence,
and care. Relying solely on section 1-102 could mean that the carefully
crafted minimum remedies, unconscionability, new section 2-206(b) on
standard form contracts, the limits on disclaimers, and the extension of
warranties might be lost via waiver language in form contract.
Another weakness of relying on section 1-102 rather than upon specific
Article 2 restrictions on waiver and on variation by agreement is that section
1-102 permits parties to define the standards by which performance will be
143. These assertions were made by some industry representatives attending Article 2 drafting
committee meetings.
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measured if the standards are "not manifestly unreasonable." A party seeking
to change the provisions of Article 2 might, for example, define in its contract
as a minimum adequate remedy, a remedy which in fact is unreasonably low.
Although that remedy could fail under the relevant substantive section, it
might survive under section 1-102 unless it provided so such a small quantum
of remedy that it would be manifestly unreasonable to define that limited
remedy as a minimum adequate remedy. For these reasons, section 1-102
does not substitute for more specific restrictions in Article 2 on waiver or
variation by agreement of certain provisions.
4. Areas Where the Article 2 Draft May Harm Consumers
In some areas, the Article 2 draft appears to be worse for consumers than
current Article 2. In addition to making liquidated damage clauses somewhat
easier to enforce,' it expands the right of cure, interfering with the operation
of the perfect tender rule. The perfect tender rule is a simple consumer
remedy.'45 If a consumer can stop payment on a check or dispute a credit card
charge near the time of the rejection, the consumer can use rejection for an
imperfect tender to achieve a complete refund, without any need for litigation.
The draft continues to permit rejection for lack of a perfect tender, but then
creates a new right of cure for a seller after a timely rejection.'46 Expanding
the time for a seller's right to cure could undermine the simple refund
mechanism available under the current perfect tender rule.
An expanded right to cure may change the relative negotiating positions of
the consumer and seller in those situations where there is a dispute about the
adequacy of an actual or proposed cure. The reason given for expanding a
seller's right to cure has been to encourage negotiation between parties.
Consumers are unlikely to have ongoing or repeat contractual relationships
for the purchase of goods with a single seller. Moreover, moving away from
simple, bright line rules will interfere with the ability of consumers to resolve
disputes with sellers without litigation.
Current Article 2 permits a seller to cure in a non-installment contract, but
only if the time for performance has not yet passed at the time of a rejection,
144. Compare Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-710, with U.C.C. § 2-809(1995). The
draft deletes the requirement of section 2-718 that liquidated damages be reasonable in light of the
difficulties of proof of loss and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy.
145. U.C.C. §§ 2-601 & cmts., 2-606(1)(a) (1995).
146. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art. 2, supra note 11, 2-709.
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or if the seller had reason to believe that the first tender would have been
acceptable and it makes a fully conforming tender.'47 Draft section 2-709(2)'
extends the time for the seller's absolute right to cure beyond the time for
performance. This expansion of cure could interfere with the practical ability
of a consumer to unwind an unsatisfactory transaction. Under the new draft,
after a consumer rejects or revokes acceptance, a seller could frustrate the
consumer's ability to cancel the contract by offering a cure which the seller
claims is conforming, leaving the consumer to accept or sue3 two
unsatisfactory choices.
Under current Article 2, if a consumer rejects or revokes acceptance, that
action is a basis to cancel the contract. The seller cannot cure after revocation
of acceptance. The seller can only cure after rejection if time remains for
performance, or if both of these conditions are met: 1) the seller had a
reasonable basis to believe that the original nonconforming product would be
acceptable; and 2) the cure offered was in fact conforming.'4 9 Draft section 2-
709 offers cure after rejection beyond the time for performance, and offers a
new right of cure after revocation of acceptance. 5 Expanded cure will as a
practical matter deprive consumers of the ability to cancel the contract where
the consumer and the seller have a disagreement of fact over whether the cure
is appropriate, timely, and of conforming goods.
It has been suggested that an expansion of seller's cure will induce parties
to negotiate over minor breaches. Unfortunately, however, in consumer
transactions, an expanded right for the seller to cure is likely to change the
balance of power between the parties after negotiation has failed. Consumers
already have every incentive to negotiate with sellers in order to secure
replacement goods rather than having to stop payment on a check, request a
charge back on a credit card, seek a refund or sue the seller. A seller whose
business practice is to provide a voluntary cure which is satisfactory to the
customer can do so without an expanded statutory right to cure.
The statutory right will become important in those instances when the
seller insists on a cure which the consumer believes is not sufficient. Under
current law, a consumer who has rejected or revoked acceptance and who
wants to insist on unwinding the transaction usually may do so. Under the
expanded right to cure, the seller may insist on a cure and perhaps force the
147. U.C.C. §§ 2-508(1), (2) (1995).
148. Jan. 1997 Draft, Art 2, supra note 11.
149. U.C.C. § 2-508 (1995).
150. Jan. 1997 Dmft, Art. 2, supra note 11, § 2-709.
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buyer who believes that the cure is inadequate to accept it or to litigate over
the adequacy of the offered cure. When there is a disagreement over the
offered cure consumers could lose the simple remedy of rejection or
revocation of acceptance, followed by cancellation and stop payment or a
credit card charge-back which a non-installment buyer now has under Article
2. Under current Article 2, the consumer simply rejects or revokes
acceptance, returns the goods, and stops payment on the check or applies for a
charge-back of a credit card payment Under the expanded right to cure, the
seller may oppose the charge-back attempt by asserting that it offered to cure
the defect in an allegedly "appropriate and timely" cure, even if it knows that
the offered cure was unsatisfactory to the consumer.
For example, if a consumer purchases an infant car seat which cannot be
properly affixed to the car, the consumer might want to cancel the contract,
get a refund, and try another brand of car seat. Under current law, the
consumer does this by revoking acceptance and disputing the credit card
charge or asking for a refund. Because the time for performance has passed
(under current section 2-508(1)) and the seller had no basis to believe that a
car seat that would not properly affix to the car would have been acceptable in
the first place (under current section 2-508(2)), the seller has no right to cure.
The consumer returns the car seat and cancels the contract. The seller now
owes the consumer a refund and has no defense for the credit card billing
dispute over the charge for the car seat.
Those same facts could lead to a different result--or to the same result
after years of litigation-under new section 2-709. Now, the consumer
revokes acceptance and the seller says, "I will give you a new car seat." The
consumer does not want to accept the new car seat, having lost confidence in
the quality of the company's products and not wanting to expose his or her
child to further risk of injury. The consumer says, "I want a refund." The
seller refuses to give the refund, asserting that the offer of cure is conforming
and does not substantially impair the value of the contract to the buyer. The
consumer is now stalemated. The price of the car seat is not worth litigating
over. If the consumer paid by credit card, he or she might still try to dispute
the credit card charge. If the consumer paid by cash or debit card, or with a
check which has already cleared, the change in law leaves the consumer with
no practical remedy.
Theoretically, the requirement that the cure not substantially impair the
value of the contract to the buyer could protect consumers. In practice,
however, it is unlikely to do so because the consumer will not be in a position
to disagree with a seller's assertion that a particular cure meets the standard,
19971
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
because litigation would be necessary to do so. The current perfect tender rule
combined with the limited cure permitted under current section 2-508 is
preferable in consumer transactions because it avoids these kinds of factual
questions.
B. Impact ofArticle 2B on Consumers as Licensees
The relatively balanced Article 2 draft stands in sharp contrast to the 1996
annual meeting draft of new Article 2B and the subsequent drafts of Article
2B. The summer 1996 Article 2B draft tilted very strongly toward the
interests of software and information providers. Although some of that tilt has
been removed, proposed Article 2B still poses grave concerns for consumers
and for other small licensees of software and of on-line information services.
Many jurisdictions have already applied Article 2 to computer software.' In
those jurisdictions, both consumer and business licensees have the rights of an
Article 2 buyer of goods. The draft of Article 2B creates a new and less
favorable legal structure for consumers and other licensees than would be
available under current Article 2, whether it is applied directly or by analogy.
The draft of Article 2B is changing rapidly. The drafting committee
reviewed its first draft in January 1996. '52 Final votes on the draft by the
Conference and the American Law Institute are currently scheduled for July
1997 and May 1998, respectively.
Because the substance of the Article 2B draft is still being modified
substantially, not all of the issues it presents for consumers may be analyzed
151. The December 1995 Article 2B draft cited 19 cases from various jurisdictions which it stated
applied Article 2 to the sale or license of computer software. Some of the cases which have held that a
purchase or license of software is treated as a sale under current Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
include: Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. WVyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Advent Sys. Ltd. v.
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1985); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Hospital Computer Sys., Inc, v.
Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1992); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361
F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Neilson Bus. Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172 (Del.
1987); Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software Inc., 510 So. 2d 1337 (La. Ct. App. 1987); and Schroders, Inc. v.
Hogan Sys., Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
152. The Article 2 drafting committee had studied these issues before the Article 2B drafting
committee was formed, and the Article 2B reporter served as a co-reporter to the Article 2 draftling
committee before the two committees were split. For a history of the work which preceded formation
of the Article 2B drafting committee, see Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B Issues: Meeting the
Information Age (on file with author); and Preface to Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B-
Licenses (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Dec. 12, 1996), available at
<http:lwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclulc.htm> (visited Jan. 24, 1997).
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here. The draft also presents serious issues for home-office software users and
small business users, which will not be discussed.
1. Improvements for Consumers Needed in Article 2B
Improvements are needed in the Article 2B draft in a host of areas. These
include:
1) Eliminate the automatic safe harbors for defining conspicuousness by
type size, use of contrasting type, and use of capital letters found in
section 2B-102(a)(6)(A) and (B). The Article 2 draft now omits such
safe harbors.
2) Eliminate the partial trumping of state consumer protection statutes
in section 2B- 104(b).
3) Follow Article 2A and draft Article 2 to permit unconscionability in
the inducement to contract as a basis for a finding of
unconscionability. This would require modification of section 2B-
109.
4) Modify section 2B-303(b) to retain the policy of current Article 2
that a no-oral modification clause in a consumer transaction must be
separately signed to be effective against the consumer.
5) Modify the standard form contract section, 2B-308, to:
a) Tie the expectations standard to the objective licensee in the
shoes of this licensee, not to the expectations of the licensor
about what a licensee would have thought; and
b) Tie the expectations standard to terms which could not
reasonably have been expected, without limiting it only to
terms which would have caused the consumer to refuse to
enter into the contract; and
c) Change the standard under which unexpected terms become
part of the contract. This section now authorizes any
unexpected term if there was a manifestation of assent to the
term. This is a far less protective standard than the parallel
provision of draft Article 2.
6) Eliminate the ability for a mass-market licensor to disclaim liability
for failure to take reasonable care to attempt to prevent viruses in
software delivered over the Internet or intellectual property
infringement, as permitted in section 2B-313(b). A similar issue
arises with respect to disclaimers of intellectual property
infringement permitted in section 2B-401 (e).
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7) Expand the right of refusal, which takes the place of rejection,
beyond software which is delivered to a consumer on "a physical
medium," i.e., on a diskette. Consumers need this right for software
purchased over the internet as well, section 2B-601(b).
8) Eliminate the authorization to extend specific performance in section
2B-711 to the obligation to make future payments.
9) Provide in Part 7 for meaningful remedies for mass-market licensees,
and for persons harmed by licensed software. As part of these
changes, section 2B-703, authorizing contractual modification of
remedy, should be amended to require that a limited remedy be at
least a minimum adequate remedy. The exclusion of incidental and
consequential damages in favor of a limited remedy such as repair or
replace should fail if the limited remedy falls of its essential purpose.
10) Eliminate the self-help remedy in section 2B-716 or restrict it to non-
mass-market licenses. The purported safeguards on the self-help
remedy depend on the possibility that the wronged party will later
sue and will be able to prove that the self-help removal was
improper. Consumers engaged in lower dollar-value licenses will not,
as a practical matter, be able to sue for wrongful self-help.
2. Areas Where Article 2B Reduces the Rights ofLicensees and
Increases the Rights of Licensors
a. Possible Interference with the Pure Self-Help Rejection Remedy
for Consumers
The Summer 1996 Article 2B draft eliminated the perfect tender rule, thus
depriving consumers of the simple remedy of rejection, cancellation, and a
demand for a refund which is available to the non-installment buyer under
existing Article 2." This remedy is important for consumers because it is
often enforceable without litigation. The consumer simply rejects, returns the
goods or software, and stops payment on the check or applies for a charge-
back of a credit card payment. Under Summer 1996 draft, consumers would
have been forced to retain software which did not fulfill the contract
description, as long as the software did not constitute a material breach of the
153. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995). There have been numerous drafts since that time. As of this writing,
the current draft is dated March 21, 1997. All citations will be to the March 21, 1997 draft, except
where otherwise noted.
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contract.'54 The licensee would be, in effect, forced to continue in a contract
with an entity that has already failed to completely fulfill its contractual
promises.
The drafting committee voted at its September 1996 meeting to reinstate
the perfect tender rule for mass-market transactions. The redraft
recharacterizes rejection as "refused." However, the draft then limits the right
of refusal to software delivered "on a physical medium," section 2B-601(b).
b. Disclaimer of Warranties Against Viruses
Article 2B also permits broad disclaimers of basic elements of the
expected contract such as delivery of software which infringes on the
intellectual property rights of others or contains viruses. Section 2B-319 of
the November 1996 draft permitted a licensor to disclaim liability even for
those viruses which could have been prevented through the exercise of
reasonable care.' The December 1996 draft was an improvement, setting
forth a general reasonable care standard. However, the disclaimer may still be
an open issue.'56 The March 1997 draft permits a simple, broadly worded
disclaimer to eliminate all responsibility for viruses (even if reasonable care
has not been taken to exclude them), except for software delivered on a
physical medium to a mass-market licensee. This means that licensors who
license software to be downloaded over the Internet will have no effective
obligation of reasonable care to avoid viruses. Ease of disclaiming the
obligation to use reasonable care to prevent viruses is unlikely to encourage
the marketing of high-quality software.
The Article 2B draft maintains the basic merchantability warranty for
consumers and other mass-market licensees, but replaces the implied
warranty of merchantability for non-mass-marketed software with a warranty
given by merchant licensors that only the media is merchantable and that the
program "will perform in substantial conformance with any promises or
affirmation of facts contained in the documentation with specification
provided with or before program delivery."'
157
154. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, § 2B-608.
155. Nov. 1996 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 19, § 2B-319.
156. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B-Licenses § 2B-318(b) & rptr.'s notes (Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Dec. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Dec. 1996 Draft, Art. 2B]
(section was renumbered in the March 1997 Draft, Mar. 1997 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 22, § 2B-313),
available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ule/ulc.htm> (visited Jan. 24, 1997).
157. Mar. 1997 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 20, § 2B-403(b).
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The Article 2B Reporter, Professor Ray Nimmer, has expressed to the
author his view that a substantial "conformance with specifications" standard
is more protective of licensees than the implied warranty of
merchantability.158 The author is skeptical that this will be the case in practice
because of the likelihood that in many transactions the licensor will either
draft the specifications itself or will have a clearer understanding of the
nuances of the specifications than the licensee has.
A small business purchasing or licensing a $5000 accounting system is an
example of where the changed standard could authorize licensing of
unmerchantable products. The specifications might say, in highly technical
language, that only ninety percent of the checks input into the accounting
system will print. Such a defect might make an accounting product
unmerchantable because printing checks is probably an expected feature of a
small business accounting system. Under the new standard, that business
would have no claim for breach of any implied warranty because the
specifications have not been violated. If a "substantial conformance with
specifications" standard is intended to raise, rather than lower, the licensor's
obligation under the implied warranty of merchantability, then it should
simply be added as an additional aspect of the implied warranty for all Article
2B transactions, rather than displacing that warranty for non-mass-market
licensees.
c. Article 2B Creates a Statutory Right to Invade the Home or
Business Computer of a Software User and Remove Software
Article 2B permits a licensor to "take possession of" software or other
licensed computer information by requiring return of the licensed information
and by preventing the licensee's continued exercise of rights in the
information.'59 This right to remove or disable software on the user's system
is available only if it can be accomplished "without a foreseeable breach of
the peace, risk of injury to persons, or significant damage to or destruction of
information or property of the licensee."' The statute contains no penalty
beyond suit for damages for removal or disablement exceeding the allowable
bounds, although that conduct might also be a common law tort.'6'
158. Meeting with Professor Ray Nimmer in San Francisco, Cal. (May 1996).
159. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, § 2B-712 (referring to § 2B-711).
160. Id. § 2B-712(a).
161. Id. § 2B-712(b).
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The apparent safeguards placed in the self-help remedy section-no
breach of the peace, no significant damage-cannot work if people who are
wrongfully subjected to self-help software removal or disablement cannot
afford to challenge the removal in court. It is highly unlikely that mass-
market licensees will bring such challenges. The amount of injury consumers
will suffer from the removal or disablement is unlikely to warrant litigation
unless it includes personal injury. Thus, statutory safeguards will have little
meaning for the average consumer-licensee who finds the software gone and
who has lost the ability to use files created under that software.
d. The Article 2B Draft Would Authorize Most Unexpected Terms
in Standard Form Licenses
One of the sharpest contrasts between the drafts of Articles 2 and 2B is in
the treatment of terms in standard form contracts. As discussed in Part II.A,
the Article 2 draft generally would enforce standard form contract terms
which were either reasonably expected by the buyer or expressly agreed to by
the buyer. The Article 2B draft would enforce terms that were neither
expected nor agreed to if the licensee manifested assent, or if the drafter of the
standard form license would not have known that the term would cause a
reasonable person in the position of the licensee to refuse the license if that
term were brought to his or her attention.
The standard form contract provision of the Article 2B draft, section 2B-
308, addresses the use of standard form licenses. 62 However, it fails to fully
serve the goal of protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties or of
promoting behavior to prevent unfair surprise in three ways. First, it
authorizes any term that a licensor would have thought that a user would
reasonably expect. Its focus is on the licensor's perspective, instead of the
licensee's. This will reduce the incentive of the licensor to try to communicate
the nature of the term to the consumer because the licensor need only show
that it thought that a licensee would have expected a term, not that a
reasonable licensee in the position of this user would have expected the term.
Second, section 2B-308 does not fully serve the goal of protecting the
reasonable expectations of the non-drafting party because it permits and
authorizes unexpected terms to be inserted in a contract by the drafting party
if the drafter knew that the licensee would have to accept the contract in spite
162. Id. § 2B-308.
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of any objection to the unexpected term. The Article 2B formulation is much
more favorable to unexpected terms than the formulation in the Article 2
revision. Under Article 2B, a term not only must be unexpected, but also must
be of the type that would cause a reasonable person in the position of the
licensee to refuse the license if that term were brought to the party's attention.
Does this mean that any time there is only one maker of the needed software,
it can put any term it likes into its license? That maker might argue that a
reasonable consumer would not reject its terms no matter how onerous or
unexpected because there is no other supplier of the product. Software makers
also might argue that a consumer would not have refused a contract
containing unexpected terms if consumers who buy the software need it
immediately, such as software to monitor a medical condition.
Third, section 2B-308 permits any term, even if it conflicts with the
agreement's negotiated terms and even if it would cause a reasonable person
in the position of the party receiving the forms to refuse the license, to
nevertheless become part of the contract if the licensee manifests assent to the
term. 163 Manifest assent to a term occurs under section 2B-112 if there is an
opportunity to review the term and conduct or an authentication relating
specifically to the term."6 Although not entirely clear, it appears that a screen
which says, "Check here if you want to read our terms" and presents two
boxes: "Check here to receive screens of gobbledygook," or "Check here to
agree to skip the boring legal jargon and agree tO the license" would meet this
standard.
A key purpose of a standard form contract section should be to promote
conduct which encourages contracts to reflect the reasonable expectations of
nondrafting parties, either by the use of contract terms consistent with their
actual expectations or by modifying expectations through express agreement
for unexpected terms. Section 2B-308 is too weak to meet this goal.
e. The Draft Permits Easy Elimination of the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Section 2B-406 makes it too easy to disclaim, the implied warranty of
merchantability. 6 Consumers pay for software because they need it to work.
A transaction in which a consumer contracts for and pays for software which
163. Id. § 2B-308(c).
164. Id.§2B-112.
165. Id. § 2B-406.
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is not merchantable should be an unusual transaction. The implied warranty
of merchantability is the fundamental warranty that the product will do what
products of that type, appearance, and condition should do. A disclaimer of
this warranty should be an extraordinary disclaimer-it means that the
consumer is licensing a product that need not work at all. Doubts about
whether there was an agreement to eliminate merchantability should be
resolved against the disclaimer because consumers are unlikely to want or
expect an unmerchantable product.
The Article 2B draft retains the concept from current Article 2 that "as is"
or other brief preprinted language is adequate to disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability. The literature cited in the Part HLI.A shows that
consumers do not understand the term "as is" to mean that a product could be
so deficient that it is legally unmerchantable. That literature generally shows
that consumers understand "as is" to mean that something minor may be
wrong or missing from the product, but not that it may not work at all for its
intended purpose.
f The Article 2B Draft Does Not Provide Meaningful Remedies for
Mass-Market Licensees
At the 1996 annual meeting floor session on Article 2B, many Conference
members questioned the remedy structure of the Article 2B draft and the
allocation of risks between licensee and licensor. The chairperson of the
drafting committee stated that these issues would be revisited over the next
year, with revision to the draft likely. Any such revision should provide for all
of the following:
1) A simple, non-litigation mechanism for a refund in the event
of a nonconforming licensed product. This could be
achieved under the current draft if the right of refusal were
broad and to permit return of a licensed product after
discovery of the nonconformity even if the product had been
delivered online.
2) A minimum adequate remedy standard similar to draft
section 2-8 10(a)(2) should be included in section 2B-703.
3) A failure of the essential purpose of a limited remedy
standard of the type found in draft section 2-810(b) should
be included in section 2B-703.
5) Incidental damages in mass-market transactions should not
be waivable.
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6) The costs of recovery from a breach which crashes a user's
system should be clearly included in the definition of
incidental damages. This could be clarified in the definition
of incidental damages in section 2B-102(17) so that small
users need not litigate over it.
7) Reasonably expected persons should be included as third-
party beneficiaries of a warranty. Third parties who are
served by the entity using a software program could be
harmed by it. For example, a hospital's use of defective
patient-tracking software could harm a patient who is not
contacted for timely follow-up visits.
8) The licensor's ability to avoid personal injury liability
caused by licensed products should be limited as it is in
current Article 2 and draft revised Article 2. For example, a
licensor who offers software marketed to manage potential
conflicts between prescription drugs should not be able to
eliminate its responsibility for personal injury caused by
flaws in that program to persons whose side-effects could
have been avoided if the program had worked as marketed.
g. Section 2B-703 on Contractual Modification ofRemedies
Exemplifies Article 2B s Remedial Imbalance
Section 2B-703 provides an example of the continuing imbalance in
Article 2B's remedy sections." It codifies a rule that clauses excluding
consequential and incidental damages are not affected by failure or even
unconscionability of an agreed remedy. This is precisely the opposite result
from the developing case law under Article 2 which recognizes that the
failure of a limited remedy in a consumer contract can resurrect otherwise
available Code remedies in a consumer contract.
Section 2B-703 also is missing a minimum adequate remedy standard
similar to draft Article 2 section 2-810(a)(2). Instead, section 2B-703(a)
expressly authorizes a limited remedy such as repair or replacement without
any requirement that the limited remedy meet a standard of minimum
adequacy. In many circumstances, a repair, replace or refund test would
undoubtedly satisfy a minimum adequate remedy test. Where such a remedy
166. Id. § 2B-706.
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would not be minimally adequate, however, it should not be authorized by
Article 2B. Here are two examples. A mass-market licensee who purchases
word processing software might reasonably be limited in its remedy to a new
copy of the software if the new copy does not have the same nonconformity
as the original (and, as not yet provided by Article 2B, if the licensee could
recover incidental damages for the cost of restoring a system crashed by the
software). However, another mass-market licensee who has licensed software
to remind a family member to take medication at specific times could incur
significant medical costs, lost work time, and other fully foreseeable
consequential losses if the software falls to properly provide the medication
reminder. In this case, the court should remain able to hold that the limited
remedy of replacing the software fails of its essential purpose, making
consequential damages available.
h. The Article 2B Draft Expands the Availability of Specific
Performance to Enforce a Licensee's Obligation to Make Future
Payments
Section 2B-711 appears to permit a licensor to receive specific
performance for the payment of future license fees if the agreement calls for
specific performance, but the usual standards for specific performance are not
met. An order to pay money (future license fees) should not be an appropriate
subject for specific performance unless the usual judicial requirement that
other remedies are inadequate is met. A court order to pay money raises
questions of enforcement by the contempt power for payment of a debt, a
concept generally discredited in our legal system. There is, in this author's
view, no reason why any part of the Code should expand the availability of
specific performance against a natural person for an obligation to pay money.
i. Other Issues
The Article 2B draft also tilts the law against consumers who license
software in other ways. It expands the enforceability of no oral modification
clauses against consumers. 167 The Article 2B draft also attempts to override
167. Id. § 2B-303(b). These sections increase the enforceability of no-oral modification clauses
against consumers by substituting a requirement of manifest assent for one of separate signature. This
will be harmful to consumers because an enforceable no-oral modification clause can reward a
commercial party that permits its salespersons or its support line personnel to make post-license oral
promises. Such oral promises could induce the consumer not to exercise contract remedies for breach.
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state consumer protection statutes under which a state might decide that some
aspects of a license must meet higher requirements than those imposed by
Article 2B for proof of agreement, conspicuousness, or which might require
signature rather than just authentication. For example, this could prevent
application of an existing state statute requiring that certain disclaimers be
effective only if they were made before a sale or license transaction, rather
than after the sale and in connection with the initial preparation for use. 6 '
Finally,'the draft defines assent to be manifested to a form if the licensee does
not return the software.
The Summer 1996 Article 2B draft had two improvements in the law for
consumers which have since been deleted. First, it recognized the need for
attorneys' fees for a licensee attempting to enforce a warranty. 69 Second, it
recognized that a licensee has a privacy interest in information it provides in
connection with a licensing transaction. 70 Both of those sections have been
deleted. The draft continues to provide some protections with respect to
choice of forum for consumer licensees.''
The Article 2B draft misses an opportunity in its failure to follow both
Article 2A and the draft of Article 2 to add "unconscionable inducement" to
the basic prohibition on unconscionable contracts and terms. Unconscionable
inducement permits a court to examine and to remedy gross unfairness in the
circumstances leading to a contract without examining the intent of the
participating parties. It is very difficult for a consumer or other small party to
prove intent. Also, consumers need protection from unintended
unconscionable inducement just as they do from intentional conduct. When a
transaction is conducted electronically rather than in person, intent may well
If the licensor can invoke a no-oral modification clause when the consumer attempts to enforce such
oral promises, then it has a reduced incentive to try to control the number and type of promises made
by its representatives. To track current Article 2, a no-oral modification clause in a consumer license
should become enforceable against a consumer only if the consumer signed the clause or provided an
electronic authentication in lieu of signature for that clause. This would implement the policy of
current section 2-209(2) which permits a clause prohibiting oral modification to be effective against a
consumer only if it is separately signed. The Article 2B draft adopts only the lesser standard of
manifest assent The substitution of "manifest assent" in Article 2B for the signature required under
existing Article 2 will have the effect of increasing the enforceability against consumers of no-oral
modification clauses when the consumer attempts to enforce oral promises made by sales or support
personnel of the licensor.
168. Id. § 2B-104(b). A state could, of course, enact legislation imposing such requirements after
adopting Article 2B.
169. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 7, § 2B-706(d)(2).
170. Id. § 2B-317(c).
171. Mar. 1997 Draft, Art. 2B, supra note 22, § 2B-107(b).
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be an impossible burden. The remedies for unconscionable inducement would
not include damages.' Instead, the key remedy would be non-enforceability
of the offending clause or of the contract as a whole.
The Article 2B draft is expected to continue to change. Some important
areas where Article 2B should be improved are better treatment of standard
terms not expected by a reasonable consumer in the position of the licensee;
elimination of the partial preemption of state consumer statutes; elimination
of disclaimer of the duty to try to prevent viruses; improved remedies for
licensees; a clear and complete preservation of the perfect tender rule's
outcome of a nonlitigation-based-refund right for consumers; and changes in
the allocation of risk between licensor and licensee on a host of issues. If the
draft presented to the Conference in the Summer of 1997 does not make
substantial changes of this type, this may show that the uniform law drafting
process is not capable of delivering a balanced and useful uniform law in the
face of the sustained pressure by an affected industry.
C. The Proposed Revisions to Existing Article 9 Solve Key Problems for
Creditors While Making More Modest Improvements, and Some
Harmful Changes, for Consumers
1. The Changes to Article 9 Will Facilitate the Taking of New Types of
Article 9 Collateral and Provide Other New Rights to Secured
Creditors
The draft revisions to Article 9 would expand the rights of secured
creditors by:
1. Sweeping more types of collateral into Article 9 and permitting
creation of an interest in collateral using broad descriptive categories;
2. Giving secured creditors a safe harbor method for providing a
notice of sale and creating a safe harbor time period for commercial
secured transactions;
3. Adding a new defense to statutory damages in consumer secured
transactions;
4. Codifying a broad definition of purchase money security interests,
172. See U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1995).
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resulting in the nondischargability of some interests in household
goods which are presently dischargable under the Bankruptcy Code;
5. Eliminating the absolute bar doctrine altogether in commercial
secured transactions;
6. Depriving courts of the equitable doctrine of constructive strict
foreclosure when a secured creditor has waited an unreasonably long
time to dispose of collateral;
7. Permitting secured parties to engage in partial, rather than full,
strict foreclosure in commercial secured transactions;
8. Expanding the definition of proceeds;
9. Reversing case law in some states holding that a secured party may
not proceed against personal property before real property;
10.Permitting filing of a financing statement without the signature of
the borrower;
11. Expanding the time period from ten to twenty days for temporary
perfection of a purchase money security interest before possession;
12. Extending successor liability for successor debtors; and
13.Streamlining the filing system and requiring filing offices to
respond within two business days to requests for information. 3
In short, the draft revisions to Article 9 seem to resolve by codification a
large number of problems which secured creditors currently face under
Article 9.. At the same time, they leave unsolved the most fundamental
problem that consumers have faced under Article 9-the problem of low
values on the disposition of consumer goods collateral. The drafting
173. See July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-102 (renumbered in Oct.
1996, Draft, Art. 9, supra note 28, § 9-112) (scope); § 9-110 (renumbered § 9-111) (all assets clause);
§ 9-504 (renumbered § 9-611) (safe harbor for notice); § 9-107 (renumbered § 9-104) (PMSI
definition); § 9-507 (renumbered § 9-625) (elimination of the absolute bar rule in commercial secured
transactions); § 9-505 (renumbered § 9-618) (addition of partial strict foreclosure, loss of constructive
strict foreclosure); § 9-306 (renumbered § 9-313) (proceeds definition); § 9-318(b) (renumbered § 9-
406) (qualifying the claims available against an assignee to those in recoupment); § 9-501(f)
(renumbered § 9-604)(eliminates the one form of action rule); § 9-304(e) (renumbered § 9-
310(e))(expanded time period); § 9-402(m) (renumbered § 9-502(m)) (eliminates borrower's signature
on financing statement); § 9-105(23) (renumbered § 9-102(23)) (successor liability); § 9-405(e)
(renumbered § 9-520(d)) (time for filing office to respond to requests).
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committee has voted to address a portion of that problem relating to sales to
the secured party or to affiliated parties, but how it will do so and whether the
approach will be effective remained unknown in January of 1997."7 The
revisions also affirmatively harm consumers in the area of statutory damages
and purchase money security interests.' However, the draft revisions also
contain a useful new provision entitling consumers who prove a violation of
Article 9 to reciprocal attorneys' fees.
76
The Article 9 draft has been criticized by members of the American Law
Institute as enabling a secured party to "lock up" all of the debtor's property.
Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law School described the Article 9
draft as permitting secured creditors "to plow the comers of the field."'77
Even commentators which are generally favorable to secured credit have
characterized the Article 9 draft as expanding the rights of creditors. One
commentator stated: "The revision will substantially expand the scope of
transactions covered by Article 9.. . .,,"' Commenting on the February 1996
draft, Barkley and Barbara Clark described the scope expansions as including
payment intangibles and commercial deposit accounts.'
The Article 9 draft will benefit secured creditors by changing legal rules to
favor the secured creditor's rights in circumstances where today a borrower or
an unsecured creditor might prevail and by providing new business
efficiencies, particularly with respect to the filing system.
Some drafters of the original Article 9 criticized it as the product of
excessive influence by the secured credit industry. ° The Article 9 draft will
be even more unbalanced than it was when Professor Gilmore criticized it in
19518' if it does not exempt consumers from the commercial secured
transactions changes and address more serious consumer problems. To date,
174. See infra Part II.C.8.
175. See infra Parts II.C.4 & 5.
176. See infra Part Ill.C.9.
177. Memorandum from Professor Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law School, to Council of the
American Law Institute (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author) (regarding a proposed Article 9 set aside
for unsecured creditors).
178. Most Recent Draft of Revised Article 9 Contains Many Changes From Current Law,
CLARK'S SECURED TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, June 1996, at 3.
179. The Clarks also list tort claims as an area of expansion. At its November 1996 meeting, the
drafting committee voted to exclude personal injury and non business tort claims from Article 9. Until
June of 1996, the Article 9 draft also contained a proposal to expand Article 9 to reach many types of
interests in insurance policies. At the June 1996 meeting, the drafting committee voted to exclude
insurance from Article 9.
180. Gilmore, supra note 78, at 48.
181. Id.
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the Article 9 drafting committee has voted to take some steps to improve
Article 9 for consumers.' 82 It has voted to limit some of the new, pro-creditor
draft changes solely to commercial secured transactions. It has voted to
address three key problems that consumers face under current Article 9, but
has declined to address others.'83 However, it has also voted in favor of
several provisions that would place consumer borrowers in a worse position
under revised Article 9 than under the current article."s
2. The Procedure That the Article 9 Drafting Committee fas Used to
Address Consumer Issues Has Providedfor Careful Thought on the
Issues but Also Created Added Hurdles for Any Pro-Consumer
Change
The procedure used by the Article 9 drafting committee has created a
much higher de facto burden for the addition of provisions benefiting
consumers than for provisions solving problems faced by secured creditors.
Consideration of consumer issues was at a serious procedural disadvantage
because the drafting committee consistently chose to discuss proposed
changes to the Code as if they would affect only commercial secured
transactions. Then, if the change was adopted for commercial transactions,
the question before the drafting committee was: "Why shouldn't consumers
be subject to the same (changed) rule?" When the drafting committee debated
a particular proposed change, it attempted to limit discussion solely to the
impact on commercial secured transactions. If the committee adopted the
change, however, consumer advocates were expected to show why the same
change should not be extended to consumers. In other words, consumer
representatives were forced to carry the burden of showing that there should
be different rules for consumer and commercial transactions even where
182. Readers examining the 1996 annual meeting draft of Article 9 should be aware that that draft
is not a good indicator of what the Article 9 drafting committee has since voted to do with consumer
issues. The Article 9 drafting committee, at its October 1996 meeting, approved consumer secured
transaction rules which are far narrower. Oct. 1996 Draft Art. 9, supra note 28. For example, the
drafting committee has approved a right to reinstatement for payment defaults, but only when a debtor
has paid sixty percent or more of the principal. Id. § 9-622. It has eliminated section 9-504A which
would have restricted the collection of certain small deficiencies. Id. § 9-610. It has also declined to
adopt the absolute bar rule as a umiform rule for consumer secured transactions.
183. These issues include low prices paid at disposition sales, overcollateralization, repeated
refinancing (sometimes called "flipping"), and an overbroad definition of default. See infra Part
IlI.C.7.
184. See infra Parts IlI.C.4, .5 & .6.
[VOL. 75:69
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/3
THE UCC DRAFTING PROCESS
consumer representatives were seeking only to retain the current law in
consumer secured transactions. After the creation of the Consumer Issues
Subcommittee in 1995, consumer issues also were generally deferred until the
Consumer Issues Subcommittee completed its work. This meant that the
discussion about whether a change should be applied to consumers occurred
months after that change in law had become part of the draft, when any
doubts about its wisdom, even in the commercial context, would have faded.
In response to the direction of the Conference's Executive Committee, the
Article 9 drafting committee appointed a Consumer Issues Subcommittee
chaired by Commissioner Marion Benfield. That committee engaged in
extensive discussion before it recommended any pro-consumer changes to the
draft. This included several full- and half-day meetings by the Consumer
Issues Subcommittee with consumer advocates and counsel for creditors.
Although this provided a thorough airing of the issues, it also meant that pro-
consumer proposals to Article 9 had to meet a much higher procedural burden
than procreditor proposals. Changes to Article 9 favorable to creditors, such
as the ten-day safe harbor, the addition of partial strict foreclosure, and the
elimination of constructive strict foreclosure, did not undergo any similar
subcommittee process. The drafting committee simply added those changes
to the draft after one or more discussions.
3. Results of the Article 9 Consumer Subcommittee Process
The Article 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee recommended two types of
Article 9 rules for consumer secured transactions.' 5 The first type of rule
exempts consumer transactions from some of the more sweeping changes
being made in the Article 9 draft for commercial secured transactions. In
these places, the different rule for consumer secured transactions simply
means preserving existing law for consumers. The Consumer Issues
Subcommittee recommended, and the drafting committee agreed, not to apply
certain changes in law being made for commercial secured transactions to
consumers. The changes which were limited to commercial transactions
include: the short ten-day safe harbor for the time of notice of a disposition
sale; the bare-bones safe harbor form for notice of the sale of collateral in a
commercial secured transaction; the addition of partial strict foreclosure; and
the addition of deposit accounts.
185. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10.
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The Consumer Issues Subcommittee also recommended, and the drafting
committee approved, some modest improvements in Article 9 for consumer
secured transactions. These are reciprocal attorneys' fees for a prevailing
consumer if the creditor has included an attorneys' fees provision in the
security agreement; a right of reinstatement after the debtor has paid more
than sixty percent of the principal (in the last one-third or later of the debt);
and some changes in the treatment of disposition sales in which the creditor
or an affiliated party purchases the collateral. An important new notice of
how a deficiency was calculated also appears likely to be included.'86 These
rules for consumer secured transactions will partially ameliorate the pro-
creditor imbalance caused by the many other changes to Article 9.
Unfortunately, the draft also contains a new defense for creditors to the
existing Article 9 statutory damages remedyand has no effective mitigation
of the harmful effects on consumers of a broad expansion in the definition of
a purchase money security interest ("PMSI"); and, as of January 1997, does
nothing outside of the interested party context to tighten the broad standard of
commercial reasonableness which has permitted low prices on disposition of
collateral.
4. There is No Adequate Basis for Introducing a New Defense to
Statutory Damages into Article 9
Representatives of consumer creditors, particularly the in-house
automobile finance companies and the American Financial Services
Association, a trade group for finance companies, asked the Article 9
Consumer Issues Subcommittee to reduce or eliminate the availability of
statutory damages after a consumer proves that a seller has violated Part 5 of
Article 9.187 The Consumer Issues Subcommittee recommended against this
type of cutback from existing law. It states in relevant part:
Article 9 now contains a few provisions protective of consumers. The
most significant of those provisions is that part of 9-507 which gives
consumers a statutory remedy unrelated to actual damages for failure
of secured parties to comply with Part 5 of Article 9 on foreclosure.
That and other consumer provisions in Article 9 have been in place for
186. The drafting committee voted for such a notice at its March 1997 meeting.
187. Section 9-507, along with the rest of Part 5, was renumbered in the October 1996 draft. The
new section number is 9-627(d).
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more than 30 years without major changes in the states. That indicates
that they are generally acceptable. Therefore, we are not inclined to
recommend changes in those provisions which would reduce their
consumer protective aspects. We agree with the position taken by the
Article 2 Consumer Subcommittee that the revision process should do
no harm to consumer interests. For example, it would not be wise to
remove the present penalty provisions of 9-507 even though creditors
make a case that those penalties are punitive and often bear no
relationship to the degree of harm caused by the particular failure
involved.'88
Despite the written recommendation of the Consumer Issues
Subcommittee against modifying the statutory damages now available under
Article 9, the Article 9 drafting committee voted to add a new defense to
statutory damages. This new defense represents a serious new hurdle to an
adequate remedy after a consumer proves a violation of Part 5 of Article 9.
The new defense is a bona fide error type defense to statutory damages. This
new section 9-627(d) would add a defense to statutory damages for a non-
intentional good faith error made despite the maintenance of reasonable
procedures to avoid the error.
Because the new defense was not recommended by the Consumer Issues
Subcommittee, there is no written record of why it was adopted by the
drafting committee. The arguments made for it were primarily that an
"innocent technical violation" should not trigger a statutory penalty. This
argument ignores the fact that statutory damages serve not only a deterrence
function, but they also provide a simple, low-cost substitute to expensive
litigation, which requires time consuming questions about the amount and
scope of actual damages. If a creditor violates Article 9, a consumer may
188. Memorandum from Article 9 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee (Marion
Benfield et al.) to Article 9 Drafting Committee, Advisors, and Observers 3 (May 29, 1996) (on file
with author) [hereinafter May 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report]. The new defense
was added to the October draft in § 9-627(d). The Consumer Issues Subcommittee's interim report of
October 7, 1996 tentatively recommends that the new defense be available only for certain types of
information required in various notices but that limitation was not adopted. Memorandum from the
Article 9 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee to the Consumer Task Force Members
(Oct. 7,1996) [hereinafter Oct. 1996, Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report].
The Article 2 Consumer Issues Subcommittee (and Article 2 drafting committee, in adopting their
subcommittee's report) reached a similar conclusion. They said that existing provisions protective of
consumers should not be eliminated absent "compelling evidence" that the provision no longer serves.
Article 2 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee, Thoughts on the Treatment of
Consumer Issues in a Revised UCC Article 2, at 3 (on file with author).
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suffer in a variety of ways, including a lower sale price, a higher deficiency,
an inability to bid at the sale, or perhaps other harm. The amount of harm
flowing from the violation can be both difficult and expensive to quantify and
prove. The simple statutory damages formula eliminates these issues,
simplifying the litigation and reducing the likelihood that difficulties of proof
will allow Code violations to occur without consequence.
The only enforcement of Article 9 is private enforcement.'89 If individual
consumers do not sometimes raise issues of compliance with the Code, there
will be no consequences of a violation. It is difficult for low- and middle-
income consumers to find affordable attorneys. Many legal services programs
no longer offer representation on consumer matters. 9 A middle-income
consumer who is being pursued for a deficiency of few thousand dollars is
unlikely to be able to pay a lawyer up front, hoping for an eventual recovery
to offset the deficiency. The need for deterrence also makes statutory
damages important. If a creditor is sued on only one percent of its violations,
and the damages are limited to the damages of that one percent of persons
who sue, then a rational, profit-maximizing creditor will violate the statute
regularly, profiting from the benefits taken from the ninety-nine percent of
those who do not sue the creditor.
Well-known commentators have recognized that statutory damages are
useful for deterrence and as a form of liquidated damages. White and
Summers, for example, state in part: "Compensatory damages are a modest
deterrent to creditor misbehavior in nickel and dime consumer transactions. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the drafters installed a statutory penalty in 9-
507 to up the ante for those who abuse the consumer."'19'
Barkley Clark characterizes the minimum civil penalty as a liquidated
damages provision allowing the consumer debtor to avoid the need to prove
actual loss.' 92 Clark also recognizes the importance of the statutory damages
provision, stating: "This minimum civil penalty, quietly tucked away in a
comer of § 9-507(1), is probably the most glittering nugget of consumer
189. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-501 rptr.'s cmt. 1.
190. Severe funding cuts have forced many of those programs to limit their legal assistance to
poor consumers to urgent matters such as housing and access to government benefits. Simon, supra
note 43.
191. 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 34-19 (4th ed.
1995).
192. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 4.12[4] (1993).
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protection found in all of Article 9."'93 The Article 9 drafting committee has
now voted to cut back on the availability of statutory damages. The new
defense represents a significant reduction in the meager level of consumer
protection provided by current Article 9. Moreover, the new defense could
weaken the basic obligation of commercial reasonableness in the disposition
of collateral, because, as drafted, it would apply to all violations of Part 6,
including violations of the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner.'"
5. The Broadened Definition of a Purchase Money Security Interest
Selected by the Article 9 Drafting Committee Will Harm Consumers
The Article 9 draft expands the definition of a purchase money security
interest ("PMSI") in two ways in new section 9-104 (old section 9-107). First,
a refinance of a PMSI would remain a PMSI to the extent of the refinanced
PMSI 95 This codifies the "dual status" rule for defining a purchase money
security interest.'96 It rejects the "transformation" rule that PMSI status is lost
on refinancing. Fifteen jurisdictions use the transformation rule, which
mandates the expiration of a purchase money security interest if the original
loan is refinanced or consolidated..97 Sixteen jurisdictions use the dual status
193. Id.
194. This is the version in the October 1996 draft. The Consumer Issues Subcommittee of the
Article 9 drafting committee has tentatively recommended narrowing this new defense so that it would
apply only to certain numbers in identified notices. Oct. 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee
Report (recommendation number 2). That recommendation reads, in relevant part:
5) Recommend that the "bona fide error" defense be available as to some, but not all, of the
information required to be given in various notices to consumer debtors. For example, perhaps
there should be no bona fide error defense as to the time and place of an auction sale, or of the time
after which a private sale will be held.
That recommendation, however, was not adopted at the March 1997 drafting committee meeting.
195. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-107(renumbered in Oct. 1996,
Draft Art. 9, supra note 28, § 9-104).
196. Id.
197. See Snap-On-Tools, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 F.2d 252 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding that a purchase
money security interest in tools does not survive consolidation of debts where the allocation of
payments was inadequate to determine which tools secured their purchase); Matthews v. Transamerica
Fin. Serv., 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that loan refinancing destroys the purchase money
nature of a security interest); Rosen v. Assoc. Fin. Serv. Co., 17 B.R. 436 (D. S.C. 1982); In re Rushdi,
174 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); In re Carter, 169 B.R. 227 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993); In re Butler,
160 B.Rt 155 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); Parish v. Lincoln Fin. Co., 147 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1992); In re Baker, 139 B.R. 468 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); In re Adoptante, 140 B.R 940 (Bankr. D.
RI. 1992); In re Kruse, 116 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990); In re Moody, 97 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1989); In re Bowen, 87 B.R. 70 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Challinor, 79 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D.
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approach, while four use the principle of novation. The case law remains
open in the sixteen other jurisdictions.
. If one believes that refinancing helps consumers to arrange for lower
interest rates, then preservation of the purchase money security interest, at
least in theory, could benefit consumers. However, the policy implications are
different if the refinance adds new collateral and extends the interest in
collateral which otherwise would have been paid off for a longer time. For
example, suppose a consumer separately purchases a television set and then a
couch from a creditor, who continues its interest in one purchase to the next
purchase. In this case, the redefinition of PMSI to include the television set
gives the creditor an extra threat to make when collecting on the debt for the
couch. The creditor can now threaten to repossess both the couch and the
television set, instead of just the couch. As a result, consumers could remain
subject to collateral-based collection activity after the first item of collateral
has been fully paid for. The Article 9 drafting committee has voted in favor of
a mandatory allocation formula for consumer secured transactions, which
could partially ameliorate this problem.19 Codifying the dual status definition
of a PMSI could give creditors both within and outside of bankruptcy added
collection leverage to threaten to repossess household goods collateral. Under
the FTC Credit Practices Rule, a creditor may not take a security interest in
certain household goods unless the interest is a PMSI. 99 Paid-for household
goods covered by the rule cannot be taken as collateral. The redefinition of a
PMSI to include refinancing may permit creditors to retain a claim on
household goods for a longer period of time. The longer the time period that
the creditor can claim these goods, the more collection leverage the creditor
will have to threaten to retake goods needed for daily living. The National
Consumer Law Center has reported that roughly two-thirds of finance
company loans are refinances." 0 The presence of a refinance rate higher than
that for other consumers could suggest that refinancing is more aggressively
"sold" in the finance company market, perhaps because it increases fee
Mont. 1987); In re Wandler, 77 B.R. 735 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987); In re Janz, 67 B.R 553 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1986); Franklin v. ITT Fin. Serv., 75 B.R. 268 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986); In re Mason, 46 B.R.
119 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Haus v. Barclays Am. Corp., 18 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1982);
Ashworth v. McMahon's Furniture, 16 B.R. 645 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); Coronado v. Beach
Fumiture & Appliance, Inc., 7 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980).
198. May 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, supra note 188.
199. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.1L § 444.2 (1996).
200. Flipping Takes a Hit in the Seventh Circuit, 14 NCLC REPS. CONSUMER CREDIT & USURY
ED. 12 (1995).
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income. The redefinition of a PMSI to reach refinancing also creates a second
way to avoid the FTC Credit Practices Rule. A creditor who has a PMSI in
household goods could retain a security interest in the household goods by
refinancing the PMSI and adding new unsecured debt in addition to the
amount refinanced. Under draft section 9-104 the refinanced loan would
remain a PMSI to the extent of the original PMSI even if the new loan could
not otherwise have been collateralized by household goods. The draft then
calls for payments to be allocated first to the unsecured portion of the debt,
leaving the creditor with collection leverage over the household goods for a
longer time, as well as improved status in bankruptcy with respect to these
household goods for a longer time.2'
In bankruptcy, the new, expanded definition of a PMSI will mean that
some liens otherwise avoidable will no longer be avoidable. For example,
liens on goods such as household goods, work tools, and health aids are
avoidable under section 522(f) if they are both non-possessory and non-
purchase money.0 2 Treating the refinance of a PMSI on these goods as a new
PMSI may preserve liens on such items that otherwise might be avoidable.
The Article 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee addressed the bankruptcy
issues and it recommended that the draffing committee add a comment to the
new definitional section that
mak[es] it clear that the revision of 9-107 is not intended to prevent
bankruptcy courts from holding that for purposes of 522(f) a
refinancing or consolidation of debt results in loss of purchase money
status. In bankruptcy, judges may decide that even though revised 9-
107 adopts a clear "dual status" rule, that rule need not apply to a
522(f) avoidance proceeding." 3
The sentiment behind the comment is helpful. However, if bankruptcy judges
look to state law to determine the status of a particular extension of credit, the
change in statutory language adopting the dual status rule seems more likely
to influence the result than a comment suggesting that bankruptcy judges may
choose to ignore the newly codified state law PMSI definition.
201. The Consumer Issues Subcommittee discussed this aspect of the issue, but had not yet
addressed it in its report as of January 1997. There seemed to be agreement in the Subcommittee and at
the March 1997 meeting of the drafting committee that the allocation rule should require that payments
be allocated first to secured debt in a mixed PMSI/unsecured debt transaction in order to facilitate the
release of the PMSI.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).
203. May 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, supra note 188, at 18-19.
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The Article 9 draft also expands the definition of a purchase money
security interest by proposing to codify as a PMSI any loan where the
collateral is mixed between purchase money and non-purchase money
collateral.2 Consumer advocates are concerned that this mixed collateral
element of the definition could encourage the over-collateralization of loans.
Existing law restricting purchase money status to those loans where all the
collateral is purchase money should have the effect of discouraging over-
collateralization.
As discussed in Part llI.C.10, refinancing by finance companies has been a
way to increase fees and charges paid by consumers. It can result in
consumers paying more, not less, in interest and fees over the life of the
refinanced loan. Over-collateralization also can drive up fees, by increasing
the dollar value of collateral upon which high-priced property insurance is
sold. By preserving PMSI status for all refinances, the proposed definition
may facilitate unneeded and high-cost refinancings. By giving PMSI status to
all mixed collateral transactions, it may also encourage the taking of
unneeded collateral.2 °5
6. The Article 9 Draft Deprives Courts of the Doctrine of Constructive
Strict Foreclosure
The comments to section 9-505 state that the draft is intended to eliminate
the doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure.0 6 The doctrine of constructive
strict foreclosure provides an equitable tool for a court to reach a just result
when a secured party has waited an unreasonably long time before disposing
of collateral. This equitable tool may be particularly needed in consumer
cases because the triggering event-the long delay-is inherently likely to
prejudice the consumer's ability to prove the amount of harm from the delay.
The later the disposition, the more difficult it will be for a consumer to
disprove the creditor's assertion of what the value would have been if the sale
had been held in a timely fashion. For example, in one case seen by a
consumer credit counselor, a creditor allegedly accepted surrender of a
mobile home and then waited a full year to sell the home, incurring additional
204. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Article 9, supra note 10, § 9-107(e) (renumbered in Oct.
1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 28, § 9-104(e)).
205. See infra Part II.C.10.
206. July 1996 Annual Meeting Draft, Art. 9, supra note 10, § 9-505 rptr.'s cmt. I. This section
has since been renumbered in Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 28, §§ 9-618, 9-620 & 9-623.
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costs of $6000 which it added to the debt. The additional costs of holding the
collateral far exceeded the amount finally realized on the home. This
consumer was unable to repay the deficiency, but her guarantor was solvent.
The delay harmed the guarantor in several ways. First, he had to resurrect
information about what the mobile home market was a year earlier, rather
than simply presenting recent value information. Second, he was deprived of
notice of the magnitude of his liability under the guarantee for a full year. A
person who knows that he has a large matured liability under a guarantee
might make different financial choices than someone who has not been asked
to pay under a guarantee. A delay in disposition is a delay in the certainty of
this obligation and a loss of time to rearrange one's financial affairs to
accommodate it.
The doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure would permit a court to
reach an equitable result when the consumer thought the surrender of the
collateral would end the obligation. Consumer credit counselors and attorneys
who represent consumers have said that consumers often believe that
voluntary surrender ends the obligation." 7 They also report that when a
secured party requests or accepts surrender, that party does not inform the
consumer that a deficiency may also be owed after the surrender.20 ' Under the
revised draft, the consumer will receive a notice that he or she may owe a
deficiency when he or she receives the notice of sale, but a long delay in
selling may also mean a long delay before receiving notice. A long period of
inaction by the secured party after accepting the surrender of collateral may
feed the consumer's misconception that the obligation is completed, leaving
the consumer surprised and unprepared when, six months or a year later, he or
she is first contacted by the creditor's collection department or by a collection
agency.
Retaining the doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure would not require
a court to find it. Instead, the doctrine would remain an equitable tool which
courts can be expected to use sparingly, just as they do today.2"
207. Meetings and conversations held between the author and consumer credit counselors serving
various California counties.
208. Id
209. For an application of the doctrine of constructive strict foreclosure, see Moran v. Holman,
514 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska 1973) (creditor repossessed defendant's truck, used it for purposes other
than preservation, and did not initiate a suit on the debt for four months). The court's rationale was an
equitable one:
Usually, due to his poor financial position, the debtor has scant prospect of obtaining an attorney,
and the amount involved is often too small to justify legal services. The possible remedies are thus
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7. The Increased Focus on Intangible Collateral Makes It Necessary
to Modernize the Restriction on After-Acquired Consumer Property
to Reach Intangible Consumer Property
Where a consumer is borrowing primarily on the security of a tangible
item, such as a car, it is highly unlikely that the creditor will give the
consumer better rates or terms if the loan agreement also identifies as
collateral intangible consumer property which the consumer has not yet
acquired (such as, for example, a future seller carry-back note on a house
which the consumer sells; or a mutual fund qualifying under the definition of
investment property which the consumer has not yet opened). Nonetheless,
current section 9-204 restricts after-acquired property clauses only for
consumer goods, not for intangible property owned by consumers. The draft
carries forward the current section without change on this issue.
The Article 9 draft adds consumer investment property as Article 9
collateral. It also generally increases the ease of enforcing a security interest
in intangibles. For example, intangibles now may be strictly foreclosed upon
even if they are not in the possession of the secured party."'
The policies behind the prohibition of interests in after-acquired consumer
goods of current law should also apply to consumer intangible property. In
particular, a consumer is unlikely to be offered more credit or improved credit
terms based upon property that he or she does not yet own. However,
permitting a non-reliance creditor to tie up after-acquired consumer
intangibles may prevent the consumer from securing other credit with those
intangibles in the future. Consumers could be harmed by expanded security
interests in after-acquired intangible collateral because those interests could
illusory in most cases. On the other hand no substantial burden is imposed upon the creditor by
requiring him to take action within a reasonable time and to abstain from making inconsistent use
of the repossessed collateral.
Id. See also In Re Boyd, 73 B.R. 122, 124-25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (creditor took debtor's boat,
used it for three months and did not make a commercially reasonable disposition when converting it to
its own use); Shultz v. Delaware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576, 578 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Wisconics
Eng'g, Inc. v. Fisher, 466 N.E.2d 745, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Haufler v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) 893, 897 (Mass. Dist. CL 1979) ("[A] secured party should not be permitted to profit by
his own failure to furnish requisite notice by both retaining the property for his own use and then
seeking additional recovery from the debtor."); Millican v. Turner, 503 So. 2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987);
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Pro-Sat Communications, Inc., I 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 407,411
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (collateral unsold after three years); Service Chevrolet, Inc. v. Sparks, 660 P.2d
760, 763 (vash. 1983).
210. Oct. 1996 Draft, Art. 9, supra note 28, § 9-618.
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permit a creditor to invoke judicial process to take property which would
otherwise be exempt from execution after a judgment. State laws generally
exempt a portion of a consumer's income and certain types of consumer
assets from execution of a judgment. These exemption from execution laws
create a quasi-"fresh start" outside of bankruptcy for the consumer whose
judgment creditors otherwise would have a claim on all the consumer's assets
and income. Allowing creditors to sweep after-acquired consumer intangible
property into security agreements would interfere with the policy of those
state exemption statutes.
In addition, as Professor William Woodward has observed, some general
intangibles owned by a consumer are in the nature of a claim for payment for
personal services."' Intangibles such as a stream of royalty payments or
income generated by a patent fall into this category. A secured creditor is
prohibited by law from taking a security interest in future, unearned wages.
Professor Woodward has pointed out that permitting after-acquired interests
in consumer intangibles generated by future services or work would frustrate
the policies underlying anti-wage assignment rules. 1 For these reasons, the
limitation on after-acquired consumer goods in section 9-204 should be
extended to reach after-acquired consumer intangibles.
8. The Draft Fails to Fully Address a Key Problem That Consumers
Have Faced Under the Code: Low Values on Disposition of
Collateral
a. The Problem of Low Values on Disposition Sales
A continuing problem for consumers under Article 9 is that courts uphold
sales that deliver low disposition prices as commercially reasonable. In
theory, a good sale should obtain a market price. However, case law shows
that trial courts have upheld sales as commercially reasonable which return
far less than the apparent market price. In addition, studies dating back over
twenty years show low prices on disposition sales relative both to published
values and to subsequent sales of the same collateral." 3 Further, even if the
211. Letter from Professor William Woodward to professor Marion Benfield (May 20, 1996) (on
file with author); Letter from Professor William Woodward to Professor Marion Benfield (Mar. 6,
1996) (on file with author).
212. See supra note 211
213. See infra note 233.
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commercial reasonableness standard should work in theory, it presents factual
questions that can be resolved only through expensive litigation. It can be
difficult and expensive for a consumer to develop and offer proof of a bad
sale procedure because typically only the creditor knows how the sale was
conducted.
There are not a large number of reported cases discussing consumer issues
because most consumers with financial problems leading to default are
unlikely to be able to afford to pursue a claim through appeal. However, the
case law does show that trial courts have accepted as commercially
reasonable sales which yielded far less than any reasonable market value of
the consumer goods collateral. In Central Budget Corp. v. Gannett,2 4 the
Gannetts purchased aused 1963 Buick for a retail purchase price of $1627.50
in 1968. Approximately three months later, the assignee of the note
repossessed the car and sold it at auction for $300.'25 The auction sale was
advertised only once and it was attended by five or six persons, some of
whom may have been employees of the dealer.2 '6 Although the disposition
sale was held only three months after the initial sale, the price was less than
one-fifth of the earlier price. Despite these facts, the trial court in Gannett
upheld the deficiency claim.17 On appeal, the Gannett court held that
commercial reasonableness required "a good faith attempt to dispose of the
collateral to the parties' mutual 'best advantage' and that ... marked
discrepancies between the disposal and sale prices signal a need for closer
scrutiny, especially where, as here, the possibilities for self-dealing are
substantial."218 Although the New York court in this case ultimately denied
recovery of the deficiency based on the questionable sale, it did so in 1975,
seven years after the disposition sale. Most consumers lack the resources to
retain an attorney for a seven-year fight over a deficiency claim.
In 1YTIndustrial Credit Co. v. Chasse,219 a creditor repossessed a $30,000
truck and after three years later sold it for $7,500. Soon after, the creditor
reacquired the truck for $9600 (128% of the disposition sale price) and, one
year later, resold it for $15,000 (200% of the disposition price)."' The ITT
214. 368 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269 (App. Div. 1975).
215. Id. at269.
216. Id. at 269-70.
217. Id. at269.
218. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
219. 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 914,916 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
220. Id.
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court disallowed the portion of the deficiency claim which was greater than
the stipulated wholesale value of the truck.2" However, the consumer was
required to litigate over the reasonableness of the sale in order to reach this
result.22
2
In Peoples Acceptance Corp. v. Van Epps,221 the Van Epps bought a five-
year-old Pontiac for $1,989 in November 1973. After five payments, Mr. Van
Epps's health apparently caused them to miss their April payment.224 The
creditor repossessed the car in June 1974 and sold it for $200.225 The court
said that the case "presents a situation of fairly recurrent nature." 6 The
disposition sale price was just over one-tenth of the sale price seven months
earlier. The court found that there was no evidence that the car had
significantly depreciated while in Mr. Van Epps's possession.227 The court
also noted that there was evidence suggesting that in other transactions, this
creditor had sold cars back to the dealership so that the dealership could resell
them at a substantial profit.228 Despite these facts, the trial court awarded a
deficiency judgment, which the court of appeals reversed.229 The consumer
had to litigate for four years over the commercial reasonableness of a grossly
low disposition sale price before the deficiency claim was finally set aside.
In American Finance Corp. v. DeLong,230 a trial court awarded a
deficiency judgment even though "American Finance Corporation sold, for
$155, an automobile with a suggested listed value of $1275." The creditor did
not present any evidence of factors which would explain the inordinate
difference."' Although this deficiency judgment was overturned on appeal,
the commercial reasonableness standard did not prevent the trial court from
awarding a deficiency judgment. Professor William Henning, a Code scholar
and a member of the Conference, has stated: "Despite the protective tone of
Article 9, case law is replete with instances in which courts have sustained
sales as commercially reasonable even though the collateral brought
221. Id. at 918.
222. Id. at 916-17.
223. 395 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 915.
227. Id. at 917.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 914, 918.
230. 437 A.2d 1100, 1101 (Vt. 1981).
231. Id.
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significantly less than its fair market value." 2
Other evidence of the problem of low values on disposition sales includes
published studies spanning twenty years which show that disposition values
for repossessed and surrendered automobiles are far below even wholesale
published values. Studies in the late 1960s and 1970s found that creditors
disposed of automobile collateral for only seventy-one to eighty-four percent
of its wholesale value. 3 A Connecticut study found that prices at disposition
sales were seventy-one percent of wholesale value and fifty-one percent of
published retail values. 4 The same cars were then resold three to five months
later for ninety-two percent of retail value. 5 A District of Columbia study
examined data from 284 auto deficiency cases in the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia. 36 The average price paid at the disposition sale was
only eighty-one percent of wholesale and sixty-two percent of retail published
values. 7 Another study examined over 200 deficiency suits filed in Alameda
County, California, between 1971 and 1973.238 This study found that
deficiency credits averaged eighty-four percent of wholesale published values
and sixty-four percent of retail published values. 239
In 1994, the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union found that
low values in disposition sales of automobile collateral remain a problem.240
232. William H. Henning, An Analysis ofDurrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257,278 (1985).
233. Philip Shuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 15, 26 (1979) [hereinafter Shuchman, Repossessed Automobiles]; Philip Shuchman, Profit on
Default: An Archival Study ofAutomobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 32 (1969)
[hereinafter Shuchman, Profit on Default]; Martin B. White, Consumer Repossessions and
Deficiencies: New Perspectives from New Data, 23 B.C. L. REv. 385, 395, 399 (1982); John C. Firmin
& Robert Simpson, Note, Business as Usual: An Empirical Study ofAutomobile Deficiency Judgment
Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REV. 511, 516-21 (1971). These studies are discussed in
more detail in Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafting of UCC Articles 2 and 9: Model Codes or Model
Dinosaurs?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 191,201-06 (1994).
234. Shuchman, Profit on Default, supra note 233.
235. Id. at 32-33. The Firmin & Simpson study also shows that these same cars are sold at or near
their retail market value on the second resale. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 233, at 518, 520. The first
resale (the disposition sale) is generally a private sale open only to automobile dealers. Id. at 516 n.29.
The second resale, conducted by car dealers who were purchasers at the disposition sale, results in the
highest possible price, because it is generally public, well advertised, and takes place on a dealer's car
lot designed to attract a large number of buyers. Id. at 519-20.
236. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 233, at 513-14.
237. Id. at518-19.
238. Ellen B. Corenswet, Note, I Can Get It for You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of
Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1081, 1084 (1975).
239. Id. at 1085 n.18.
240. This research and the table in the text following this note were first reported by this author in
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That Office examined court files in deficiency suits filed from January 1992
to May 1994. The court files showed disposition prices of seventy-three
percent of published wholesale values (fifty-three percent of retail). In forty-
seven of the fifty cases in the sample, the creditor characterized the vehicle's
condition as average or good on a court-required report.
The following table shows the results of these four studies:
Disposition Sale Price Price as a Percent
Study Year as a Percent of Retail of Wholesale Value
Value
Suchman 1969 51% 71%
Firmin & 1971 62% 81%
Simpson
Corenswet 1975 64% 84%
Consumers 1994 53% 73%
Union
There are several reasons why a creditor might sell an item for less than its
full wholesale value. Auto financiers sometimes have business arrangements
that insulate them from the ill effects of low sale prices. Creditors who
purchase notes from automobile dealers may require the auto dealers to
compensate them for losses suffered when car buyers default on loans the
dealer originated.24' The secured party also may have an incentive other than
minimizing the deficiency when it sells a repossessed car or other consumer
good. The secured party, for example, might simply wish to sell the collateral
as quickly or cheaply as possible. Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons 42 provides an
insight into another reason why a secured party might sell collateral for less
than the best price. In that case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld a jury
finding that cars retaken by Ford from an auto dealership were disposed of in
Model Codes or Model Dinosaurs, supra note 233. Thipphavone Phabmixay Ark, Fellow for
Economic Justice, performed the research at the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union in
June and July of 1994. Seventy automobile deficiency suits were reviewed, but the number was
reduced to fifty cases because of incomplete court records.
241. David B. McMahon, Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments Under UCC
Article 9: An Analysis of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 64 (1994); Shuchman,
Profit on Default, supra note 233, at 24-26; Corenswet, supra note 238, at 1081-82. The structure of
one such reserve account is discussed in the Amended Answer and Counterclaim, National Bank of
Commerce v. Smith, Nos. 89-C-934 89-C-2679 (W. Va., Kanawha County Cir. Ct. 1990).
242. 405 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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a commercially unreasonable manner. 43 The evidence supporting the jury's
finding of commercial unreasonableness showed that the repossessed cars
were sold differently than cars owned by the dealer.2" These differences
included offering for sale all the cars that Ford owned first, while placing the
dealer-owned disposition sale cars at the end of the dealer-only auction, and
withholding dealer incentives normally offered by Ford on cars it sold for its
own account.245
The disparity between the value of the goods, even as used goods, and the
amount credited after a disposition sale is a key problem for consumers.
Current Article 9 permits a secured party to sell the collateral in the way most
convenient to it, so long as it meets the minimal standard of commercial
reasonableness, and then to pursue the consumer for the deficiency even if the
deficiency would have been lower if a different sale method had been
selected. Consumers who believe that the secured creditor sold the collateral
for too low a price, inflating the deficiency, have little recourse unless they
can engage in long and fact-intensive litigation about the reasonableness of
the sale.
b. Solutions to the Issue of Low Values on Disposition Sales
Consumer advocates have proposed a number of different approaches for
tightening the commercial reasonableness standard in order to address the
persistent problem of low values on the sale of collateral. All of those
proposals have been vigorously resisted by the secured creditor observers to
the Article 9 process. The Article 9 drafting committee rejected two of the
proposals, a fair value proposal and a safe harbor for sales which deliver blue
book value, for application to all disposition sales.
Approaches that could improve the situation for consumers under the
Code with respect to low prices on disposition sales include requiring: the
secured party credit to the debt an amount between the retail and wholesale
value of the collateral, as is required in Connecticut;246 at least the fair
wholesale value of the collateral be credited against the deficiency; the
amount credited to the deficiency be measured by the results of the next sale
following the disposition sale; the disposition sale be a retail sale, or one
243. Id. at 378.
244. Id. at 376 n.16.
245. Id.
246. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-785(g) (West Supp. 1996).
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which uses methods designed to bring the best possible price; or that the price
paid at the disposition sale independently meet the standard of commercial
reasonableness regardless of whether there is also evidence of a bad sale
procedure.
The Connecticut approach and the fair value approach are the only two
approaches that fully address the problem of low values on disposition of
consumer collateral because they are likely to affect creditor behavior without
litigation. Both of these approaches shift the focus from the sale procedure to
the amount credited against the debt. Both would require that a secured party
who wishes to pursue a deficiency first credit against the debt a particular
amount to the account. Under the Connecticut approach, the credit would
have to be the average of the retail and wholesale published values for the
goods. Under the fair value approach, the credit would have to be within the
range of published wholesale values for the same type of goods in their age
and condition at the time of disposition.
These approaches would not prevent a creditor from choosing to sell the
goods more quickly for a low price rather than taking steps to increase the
sale price. However, that decision by the creditor would not affect the amount
of deficiency owed by the consumer. A fair value rule would give the secured
party the maximum incentive to actually get the fair value at the disposition
sale and allow the party to choose to accept less at its own cost in order to
serve its own convenience.
The fair value proposal is not new but is a modification of a proposal
made by Mr. Donald Rapson.247 Mr. Rapson correctly notes that procedures
for the sale of a car by a lender, which meet the legal standard of commercial
reasonableness, frequently produce no bidders at the sale.248 He suggests that
a deficiency should be uncoupled from the actual price received at the sale
and instead tied to the price that would have been achieved if there had been a
commercially reasonable sale.249 To implement this approach, a new Section
9-504(6), or, under the new renumbering scheme, a new section 9-610(c),
could be added, stating:
For consumer secured transactions, a secured party which wishes to
pursue any deficiency otherwise permitted by contract and law shall
credit against the indebtedness the greater of the proceeds of the
247. Rapson, supra note 56, at 680-88.
248. Id. at 685 n.112.
249. Id. at 687.
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disposition or the fair market value of the collateral, less reasonable
costs of disposition. The secured party shall have the burden of
showing that the amount of the credit meets this standard. A debtor in
a consumer secured transaction is not liable for any deficiency unless
the secured party proves that it complied with this subsection.
Other methods of addressing the issue of low values on disposition of
collateral are not as effective as a fair value or wholesale/retail value credit
requirement, because the other methods focus on the sale rather than the
amount credited against the debt. They will require litigation to be
implemented. One such method is to at least recognize that price, as an
independent term of a disposition sale, must be commercially reasonable. If
price is a term, then a consumer who is challenging an allegedly bad sale will
be able to offer proof that the price was below the market. The creditor could
then defend by showing that the market price was in fact lower for this
collateral, perhaps due to its age, condition or other factors affecting the
market. Treating price as a term that must be commercially reasonable would
not invalidate every sale with a low price. Rather, a creditor whose sale
brought a low price would have to prove to the court that the low price was in
fact a commercially reasonable market price given market factors such as the
age and condition of the goods. Whether and how the Article 9 draft
eventually addresses this problem will tell a great deal about whether the
UCC drafting process is fit to produce uniform laws affecting consumers.
9. The Drafting Committee Has Voted to Address the Serious Issue of
Low Prices at Disposition Sales Where the Buyer Is the Creditor or
an Entity Affiliated with the Creditor
The Article 9 drafting committee voted at its June 1996 meeting to address
one subset of the issue of low values in disposition sales. That subset is the
group of sales where the buyer is the secured party, a recourse party, or a
party affiliated with the secured party. Where the parties have other business
relationships, those relationships may remove the economic incentive to try to
get a good price on the disposition. Where there is a dealer reserve account,
for example, the secured party selling the collateral may be assured of being
made whole by a payment from the reserve account regardless of the price
paid at the disposition of the collateral. The Article 9 Consumer Issues
Subcommittee recognized this problem, stating in part:
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If the secured party, a person who is liable to the secured party for the
unpaid debt ("recourse party"), or a person who is under substantial
common ownership with the secured party ("related party") can buy at
the foreclosure sale, there is a positive incentive for them to buy at
below the fair foreclosure value of the collateral. In all three cases, the
actual "price" paid at the foreclosure sale is economically irrelevant to
them except as it fixes the amount of deficiency. The lower the
foreclosure sales price paid, the larger the deficiency which may be
recovered from the debtor. And there is an opportunity for the secured
party, recourse party, or related party to sell the collateral at a price
which nets them more, sometimes substantially more, than the price
they bid at the foreclosure sale."
Reported cases illustrate how a secured party's expectation of reselling the
collateral after buying it at the disposition sale or a secured party's
relationship with the bidder may depress disposition sale prices. In Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Timmco Equipment, Inc.,2s a Florida trial court awarded a
deficiency judgment even though the collateral had been damaged by fire
while in the creditor's possession and had not repaired prior to the sale. In
reversing, the court of appeals held the failure to repair the fire damage was
unreasonable and noted that "soon after" the disposition sale, the secured
creditor resold the equipment for three times the price it had paid at the
disposition sale.252 This case suggests that a secured party may have an
incentive not to secure the maximum price at the sale, particularly if it can
resell the item and retain the difference in proceeds.
In Savage Construction, Inc. v. Challenge-Cook Brothers, Inc.,211 a
secured creditor failed to notify an interested party about an auction of the
four cement mixers, even though the party was actually negotiating for the
purchase of one of the cement mixers. The secured creditor purchased all of
the mixers at auction for $39,500 each. 4 The court said: "Within two weeks
after the auction, [the secured creditor] sold two of the cement mixers for a
combined cash price of $99,000, plus tax, and the other two cement mixers
for a total of $94,000 plus tax on a conditional sales contract.""55 In this case,
250. May 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, supra note 188, at 7.
251. 507 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
252. Id. at 660.
253. 714 P.2d 573, 574 (Nev. 1986).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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the auction sale brought $158,000 and then the creditor/purchaser resold the
same goods within two weeks for a total of$193,000.1
6
In Truck Center of Tulsa, Inc. v. Autrey, 2 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court
found that an alleged disposition sale was a "setup deal" for the purpose of
inflating the deficiency. In that case, a creditor repossessed a Freightliner
truck and resold it for $18,000.258 Then, the creditor, who was also the dealer,
bought the truck for $18,100 the next day and later sold it for $39,000.259 The
debtor was eventually able to have the deficiency judgment set aside, but only
after a four-year delay from the date of the repossession.26°
The Consumer Issues Subcommittee recommended that the draft
committee reporters prepare a proposal to address sales-to-self and sales-to-
interested-parties.26' In discussing that proposal, the subcommittee discussed
both a fair value rule, limited to transfers of collateral from a consumer
secured transaction, and a rule for higher scrutiny of the price paid in a sale-
to-self, a recourse sale, or a sale to an affiliated party.262 In discussing these
possibilities, it stated:
A third possible way to protect against inflated deficiencies if the
secured party, a recourse party, or related party buys at the foreclosure
sale, is to subject to higher than usual scrutiny the price received and
other aspects of the sale. For example, the secured party might be able
to measure the deficiency by the price received only if a special
showing is made that actual bona fide offers were received from
unrelated prospective buyers, or that bona fide efforts to secure fair
foreclosure value at the foreclosure sale were made. Under such a rule,
if the secured party does not meet the higher standard of proof as to the
reasonableness of the price received, or as to the efforts made in the
sale to secure a reasonable price, the secured party, even though it had
a commercially reasonable sale, would not be able to use the sale price
to measure the deficiency.
256. Id.
257. 836 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Ark. 1992).
258. Id. at 360-61.
259. Id. at 361.
260. Id. at 366-67.
261. May 1996 Art. 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee Report, supra note 188, at 7-11.
262. Id. at 10-11.
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It is perhaps relevant to the Drafting Committee thinking on the
issues involved here that The Restatement of the Law of Property
(Mortgages), Tentative Draft No. 5, Section 8.4, (approved by the
American law Institute this May) provides that in all actions for
deficiency after a real estate mortgage foreclosure, the debtor may
request that the fair market value of the collateral as of the date of
foreclosure be determined. If such a request is made, any deficiency is
based on the difference between the debt and the fair market value. But
if no request is made for that determination, the deficiency is the
difference between the foreclosure sales price and the debt. That rule is
supported by statutory or judge made law in about half the states which
apply to some or all real estate mortgage foreclosures.
Application of a fair market value test for deficiency recovery in all
Article 9 transactions, even all consumer transactions, is probably not
justified. Deficiency claims are likely to be smaller in consumer
personal property transactions. Further, the Article 9 requirement that
foreclosure sales be commercially reasonable protects against
unreasonably low foreclosure sale prices. In contrast, the typical real
estate foreclosure statute imposes judgment-sale-like procedures on
real estate foreclosures which make it very unlikely that the real estate
will bring a reasonable market price. Also, in real estate transactions it
is much more likely that the mortgagee will bid in at the sale.
However, in consumer secured transactions in which the secured
party, a recourse party, or a related party, buys at the foreclosure sale, it
may be reasonable to require the person suing for a deficiency, on
demand of the debtor, to make a special showing as to the
reasonableness of the price received. In the absence of that proof,
reasonable foreclosure value of the collateral might be the basis on
which to determine the amount of the deficiency.
The Subcommittee has not fully considered possible methods, other
than ... those mentioned here, by which to protect against self-dealing
in the three situations discussed here. Therefore, our recommendation
is that the reporters be instructed to prepare provisions that subject to
higher than usual scrutiny the price paid by a secured party, recourse
party, or related party, and other aspects of any foreclosure sale in
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which those parties buy the collateral. In preparing those provisions,
the reporters are not limited to the suggestions made here.263
It remains to be seen whether the approach now being drafted to deal with
this subset of the low value problem will have a broad and meaningful impact
outside of litigated cases.
10. The Drafting Committee Addressed a Major Consumer Problem in
Providing for a Reciprocal Attorneys 'Fees Provision
One of the consumer problems under the current Article 9 that the draft
does address is the availability of attorneys fees. Asserting a consumer's
rights under the Code is expensive. Frequently, the issue of compliance with
Article 9 will arise in a collection suit. A consumer who is being sued for a
deficiency is highly unlikely to be able to hire an attorney and pursue a claim
against the creditor for alleged violations of Article 9. The Article 9 drafting
committee voted to provide some parity between the parties by providing that
in a consumer secured transactions, a consumer debtor or guarantor would be
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees after proving a violation of Part 5 of
Article 9 if the loan documents included an attorneys' fees provision in favor
of the creditor.2" The drafting committee recognized that consumer
borrowers are not in a position to bargain for inclusion of attorneys' fees
provisions in their security agreements and that secured creditors include
provisions entitling them to fees as a matter of course. The reciprocal rule
creates a more level playing field between the secured creditor and the
consumer.
Allegations that the availability of attorneys' fees will promote groundless
litigation are unlikely to be borne out because these cases will remain fact-
based and expensive to pursue.2 65 The up-front expense, including costs for
experts, of such litigation can be expected to continue to deter the filing of
unwarranted suits. In addition, several states have reciprocal contract-based
attorneys' fees statutes which should apply to security agreements, just as
263. Id.
264. Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, Secured Transactions; Sales of
Accounts and Chattel Paper § 9-628 (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Feb. 1997),
available at <http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulelulc.htm> (visited on Apr. 16, 1997).265. whether or not a sale was commercially reasonable is a factual question which cannot be
determined quickly and easily prior to trial.
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they apply to other types of contracts.2" Those statutes do not appear to have
interfered with the provision of secured credit or to have spurred unfounded
litigation.
11. The Assumptions Underlying Revised Article 9 Have Not Been
Proven for Consumer Credit
Both the flexibility granted to creditors under existing Article 9 and the
broad extension of that flexibility under the Article 9 draft seem to be based
on unspoken assumptions about the need for more credit and the benefits of
secured credit. For example, seemingly implicit in the work of the Article 9
drafting committee is a goal that Article 9 should facilitate the extension of
additional credit. There is, however, no evidence that consumers need more
credit or that secured credit is any better for consumers than unsecured credit
In just the past ten years, consumer credit card debt has tripled.267 Credit
card debt, which is usually unsecured, exceeds $387 billion. In 1994, credit
card companies mailed 2.1 billion solicitations for credit cards to
consumers.68 In June 1995, U.S. consumers had $1.02 trillion in available
credit on existing credit card lines.269 Installment debt reached nineteen
percent of after-tax income in 1995.270 This figure does not include
mortgages, home equity lines, or auto lease payments.27 The number of
secured credit cards in the United States has doubled since 1992, to over
900,000 in circulation.2 72 There is simply no evidence that the availability of
consumer credit is too limited, even for consumers with poor credit
histories.
273
266. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 1994
& Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.096 (1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-56.5 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
267. John Shmeltzer, Credit Boom Is Helping U.S. Consumers Go Bust, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1995,
at 1, available in Westlaw, CHITRIB Database.
268. Id.
269. Christine Dugas, Rising Tide of Debt: Many Families are Living on the Edge, USA TODAY,
Oct. 30, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2954808.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 108 (Michael
Hudson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Hudson].
273. Indeed, the trade press reports indicate that lending to consumers with poor credit is a
profitable market which many lenders are entering. See, e.g., Lisa Fcikenscher, Recruiting Big Issuers
to Secured Cards, AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10176016; Daniel Kaplan,
Banks Join Race to Buy Subprime Auto Lenders, AM. BANKER, Aug. 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL
6918488; Edward Kulkosky, Keycorp Forms Unit Focusing on Consumer Finance, AM. BANKER,
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Perhaps the most intuitive of all of the assumptions regularly made about
secured credit is that it is cheaper than unsecured credit. In an ideal economic
world, this would be true. However, it is not always true in consumer credit.
Unsecured credit cards are available to consumers at interest rates ranging
from six to twenty percent, with the most common interest rate between
sixteen and eighteen percent. 4 According to statistics compiled by the State
of California for 1993, the median annual percentage interest rate charged by
personal property brokers, a type of finance company offering secured credit,
was a range of twenty to almost twenty-five percent on loans up to $2500,
and a range of fifteen to almost twenty percent on loans of $2500 to $9999.275
Another unspoken assumption about Article 9 is that refinancing is
generally good for debtors. This is undoubtedly true for commercial debtors,
and has been true for many middle-income homeowners nationwide in times
of falling interest rates. For low-income consumers, however, refinancing has
traditionally been a tool to exploit and abuse the consumer.27 6 Justice Posner's
1996 opinion in Emery v. American General Finance, Inc. illustrates the way
that refinancing of secured credit can dramatically increase a consumer's
costS.277 Justice Posner observed that not all consumers are able to protect
themselves in the credit market.
278
In Emery, a consumer received a solicitation for additional credit.279 When
the consumer inquired about the new credit, she was presented with papers to
refinance an existing loan.2"0 The refinance apparently resulted in additional
Sept. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10176005; Old Formula Proves Beneficial to Lender, MORNING
NEWS (Wilmington, DE), May 20, 1994, available in 1994 WL 13982446 (reporting that Beneficial
Corporation expects record profits by lending money to poor people at high prices).
274. Linda Sherry, 1995 Credit Card Survey: High Rates Obscured by "Teaser" Come-Ons,
CONSUMER ACTION NEWS, MarJApr. 1995, at 1.
275. FIN. SERVS. DIV., BUS., TRANSP. & HOUS. AGENCY, STATE OF CAL., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT:
OPERATION OF FINANCE COMPANIES LICENSED UNDER THE PERSONAL PROPERTY BROKERS LAW,
CONSUMER FINANCE LENDERS LAW AND COMMERCIAL FINANCE LENDERS LAW 14 sched. J.
276. For a discussion of how this has been done with home secured credit, see NORMA PAZ
GARCIA, DIRTY DEEDS: ABUSES AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA'S HOME EQUITY
MARKET (W. Coast Reg. Office, Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. Oct. 1995); see also KEVIN BYERS,
FAST CASH FOR HOMEOWNERS: A STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING BY CONSUMER FINANCE
COMPANIES IN THE RICHMOND, VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN AREA, June 1994, at 14-15 (reporting that
nearly two-thirds of all loans made by finance companies are refinancings of existing borrowers, and
suggesting that an aggressive cycle of refinancing is one of the phenomena that trap low income and
minority borrowers into high-cost sources of credit).
277. 71 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir. 1995).
278. Id. at 1347.
279. Id. at 1345.
280. Id. at 1345-46.
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cash to her of $200, plus approximately $200 in increased insurance and other
fees or expenses. 8 ' The court said that in order to receive this extra $200 to
$400 in credit, the borrower's interest rate remained at thirty-six percent,
while her payments increased by $18.73 for each of the remaining thirty
months of her loan. 2 In addition, the creditor added six payments to the
loan.2
8 3
Justice Posner discussed the cost of refinancing for this consumer, stating:
The increment in cost to her came to about $1,200, paid over three
years, and this is for the right to get only $200 now. The cost to her of
borrowing $200 in this way was roughly three times as great as it
would have been had she borrowed that amount for three years in a
separate loan at the annual interest rate of 36 percent. By our
calculation, the implicit interest rate that she paid for the $200 loan
exceeded 110 percent per annum. This was not disclosed on the Truth
in Lending Act form that Emery received because the Act treats the
transaction as a reborrowing of the original amount of the loan plus
$200. So much for the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for
borrowers.284
These facts might seem surprising to those whose legal practice or
experience has not exposed them to creditors who make loans at thirty-six
percent annual interest rates. However, these facts would not be surprising to
consumer advocates who have observed the practices of the consumer finance
industry over the years.
A recent book, Merchants of Misery, reports similar problems faced by
consumers with secured credit from finance companies.28 This book contains
reports of finance company practices from around the United States. 286 It
includes, for example, a report of a consumer who attempted to borrow
$2,000 from Associates Financial.287 The book reports that the consumer
received an interest rate of over thirty-three percent, plus $1,200 in added
281. Id. at 1346.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1346.
285. Hudson, supra note 272.
286. Id. The book also documents problems experienced by poorer or less educated consumers in
dealing with other financial services vendors. See, e.g., id. at 180-96.
287. Id. at 3.
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charges for insurance and other items." 8
Merchants of Misery also contains a report from a journalist who
investigated the practices of California finance companies.289 A large finance
company asked the journalist to provide a car valued at $7,000 as security for
a $1,500 loan.290 That loan would be made at an annual interest rate of
24.5%.291 Having more collateral to offer does not seem to have lowered the
rates in this case. Another California finance company offered the same
reporter a rate of 25.3%.292
Assumptions about the way the world operates are reflected in the policy
judgments made in the draft. If one believes that entities covered by a statute
usually will not go to the outer limits of permitted conduct, one might be
inclined to give more latitude. The reports found in Merchants of Misery and
facts such as those recited by the Emery court suggest that some of the
creditors whose conduct is governed by Article 9 are likely to test the limits
of the law. The lack of familiarity with the industries where this type of
conduct may occur can lead to the rejection of needed legal rules in favor of
flexibility, without realizing that flexibility can provide an opportunity for
abuse.
The assumption that both refinancing and more credit are always good for
debtors has had a demonstrable policy outcome in the Article 9 draft. This is
shown both in the broad definition of purchase money security interests
which includes refinancing and in the tendency of the draft to expand the
types of collateral in which an Article 9 security interest can be taken.
IV. THE NONUNIFORM AMENDMENTS MADE TO ARTICLES 3 AND 4
ILLUSTRATE THE TYPES OF QUESTIONS STATE LEGISLATORS CAN BE
EXPECTED TO ASK ABOUT ARTICLES 2, 2B AND 9
The nonuniform amendments made to UCC Articles 3 and 4 show that
legislators will amend uniform laws if they find them unfair to consumers.
These amendments occurred despite the lack of any organized or national
consumer opposition to Articles 3 and 4.293 Those nonuniform amendments
288. Id.
289. Id. at30-41.
290. Id. at 39.
291. Id.
292. Id.at4l.
293. There was state-level consumer opposition in Massachusetts and West Virginia. The
revisions had not yet passed in Massachusetts as of the summer of 1996.
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were remarkably similar, suggesting that the issues could have been handled
uniformly in the drafting process. The nonuniform amendments to Articles 3
and 4 cover reducing the opportunities for a new bank fee for copies of
checks, preserving state policies requiring the provision of a nontruncated
checking account, requiring a certain amount of information provided on
checking account statements, preserving the consumer's ability to prove
payment without having the original check, avoiding the likelihood that the
new procedure for postdating could create new bank fees and permit
defrauding of consumers, and modifying the allocation of risks and benefits
of not examining signatures on checks.
A. Truncation-Related Amendments
Many of the nonuniform amendments to Articles 3 and 4 address the
effect of truncation on consumers. Articles 3 and 4 promote the nonreturn of
checks by extending the obligation on the consumer to examine not only bank
statements, which include returned checks, but also those that do not.94 As
the law encourages truncation, consumers are less likely to be able to get their
original checks back with their statements as a matter of course. In addition,
as truncation spreads, banks are more likely to charge a fee for copies of
checks.
Articles 3 and 4 facilitate the opportunity for a new fee, but then do not set
or cap that fee. State legislatures addressed this issue by requiring from two to
five free copies of checks per statement period. California, Colorado and
Washington require two free copies of items per statement period, upon
request of the customer. 95 In Washington, these requests must be fulfilled
within ten business days.296 The West Virginia legislature amended Article 4
to require eighteen free copies of checks per year.2 97 The New Hampshire
294. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1995).
295. CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(b) (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-4-406(b) (West
1996). California, Colorado, and Washington also required that if items are not returned to the
customer, the bank must include on the statement a phone number that customers may call to request
an item or copy of an item. CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(a) (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-4-406(a) (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-406(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
296. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-406(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996). By a non-Code statute
enacted through the same bill as the revised Articles 3 and 4, Washington also limits the charge for
items after the first five per statement period to fifty cents per item plus search time at a fee not higher
than the search time charge for complying with an IRS summons. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 30.22.230 (West Supp. 1996).
297. W. VA. CODE § 46-4-406(g) (1993).
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legislature required that the cost of all copies of checks be reasonable and that
the bank provide, on request, up to ten items or copies of items per statement
period.29 The New York Law Revision Commission recommended that
section 4-406 be amended to require return on request of at least two free
items, or copies of items, per statement period.299
Legislatures in some states amended Articles 3 and 4 to preserve state
statutes which require offering a nontruncated checking account. The New
Hampshire legislature amended section 4-406 to permit banks to decline to
return items only "if the customer agrees."30 The Vermont legislature
imposed a nonuniform amendment requiring that if the customer so requests,
items or copies of items paid shall be returned with the account statement.30'
If the customer does not so request, then the bank may provide a statement
containing the information detailed in section 4406.302 The West Virginia
legislature amended Article 4 to require banks to offer "at least one account,
at a reasonable charge," where all items or legible copies of the items are
returned.3" 3 The New York Law Revision Commission recommended that
section 4-406(a) be amended to require that checks be returned with the
statement on the accounts of natural persons unless the bank has an account
which offers check return?" In Massachusetts, the state policy favoring
availability of a nontruncated account has been a major stumbling block to
the adoption of Articles 3 and 4. The Massachusetts Commissioners engaged
in negotiations with the Consumers Coalition, the Attorney General's office,
the Office of Consumer Affairs, and the Massachusetts Bankers Association
to try to address this issue. As of Fall 1996, it appeared likely that the
eventual solution will treat the existing state statute requiring offering of a
nontruncated account as trumping Articles 3 and 4.
Two state legislatures and the New York Law Revision Commission have
also addressed the amount of information a consumer should receive on a
truncated account statement. Section 4-406(a) defines as adequate a bank
statement which contains only the item number, amount and date of
298. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:4-406(b) (1994).
299. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLES 3 AND 4 INTERIM REPORT 16 (Aug. 1995) [hereinafter N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N
REPORT].
300. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:4-406(a) (1994).
301. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 4-406(a) (1994).
302. Id.
303. W. VA. CODE § 46-4-406(g) (1993).
304. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 15-16.
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payment" 5 The actual items need not be returned, nor must the statement
provide the name of the payee.3"' Article 4 excuses banks from providing the
name of the check payee regardless of how inexpensive it might to provide
that information in the future. California and Washington placed a "sunset"--
an automatic expiration-on this broad safe harbor.3 7 The New York Law
Revision Commission has also recommended a "sunset" provision to prevent
freezing in this minimal amount of information as all that will ever be
required regardless of technological progress.
308
B. Proof of Payment
Some state legislatures also saw a gap in new Article 4 with respect to
proof of payment after destruction of a check. Section 4-406(b) authorizes the
destruction of original checks so long as the capacity to furnish copies is
retained for seven years."° There is no minimum time period for retention of
original checks. The West Virginia legislature made a non-uniform
amendment stating that a bank's return of a copy of the item and the
statement is prima facie evidence of payment.10 The California legislature
made a similar change to its Evidence Code.3 ' The New York Law Revision
Commission recommended that section 4-406(b) be amended to require that a
copy of both sides of the item be provided on request."2 It further
recommended that the bank be liable for damages for failure to provide a
copy within a reasonable time.3"3 The damages are presumed to be equal to
the amount of the check, but they may be modified upon proof of additional
evidence. 14
305. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1995).
306. Id. Although former Article 4 did not require the return of paid items, the new section
explicitly extends the obligation of the consumer to discover errors to statements which omit payee
information and do not include return of the checks.
307. In both cases, the safe harbor expires on January 1, 1998, unless extended by future
legislation. CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(g) (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-406(a)
(West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
308. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 4, 17-18.
309. U.C.C. § 4-406(b) (1995).
310. W. VA. CODE § 46-4-406(g) (1993).
311. CAL. EVID. CODE § 670 (West 1995), 1992 Cal. Stat. 914.
312. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 19-20.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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C. Unintended Effects ofRequirement for a Postdating Order
Some state legislatures also recognized that Article 4 inadvertently created
a new tool to defraud consumers by requesting a postdated check. Section 4-
401(c) authorizes banks to honor a postdated check whenever submitted
unless a postdating order has been filed.315 Article 4 does not contain any
mandated disclosure of the new legal right of banks to honor checks before
their date. This opens the door for fraudulent inducement of a postdated check
by persons who induce the check based on the consumer's belief that it is not
yet good, then promptly cash it. The interim report of the New York Law
Revision Commission recommends conditioning the right to honor the check
before its date upon notice to the customer in the account agreement or in a
subsequent conspicuous written notice stating that the check may be honored
before its date.3? 16 The California legislature addressed this problem by adding
to the bill containing Articles 3 and 4, an amendment to its Unfair Business
Practices Act. That amendment prohibits the practice of both inducing and
cashing a postdated check before its date unless the recipient of the check
provides written notice that a postdated check may be cashed immediately. 7
Several state legislatures have also addressed the probability that the new
requirement for filing a postdating order under Article 4 could create a new
fee opportunity for banks. The Washington legislature amended Article 4 to
prohibit charging a fee for filing a postdating order.3"' The West Virginia
legislature amended Article 4 to require a bank to accept up to nine postdating
orders per year without charging a fee for filing the notice and monitoring the
account for the check.319 The New York Law Revision Commission
recommended that Article 4 be amended to require no charge for the first
twelve postdating orders filed per account per year. 320
315. U.C.C. § 4-401(c) (1995).
316. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 8.
317. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.6 (Vest Supp. 1996). West Virginia made a similar
change to its Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statute using a companion bill. That change
made it illegal to solicit or accept a postdated check with the intent of presenting it for early payment
or to represent that postdating will prevent the early payment of a check and then either present the
check before its date or lack reasonable procedures to prevent premature presentation. W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6-110 (1995). Statutory damages, penalties, and fees and costs apply in the event of a violation
of this section. Id.
318. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-401 (West 1995).
319. NV. VA. CODE§ 46-4-401(c) (1993).
320. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 8. Another issue that two states
addressed was whether the process of posting sections would authorize abuse. Section 4-402(c)
contains new language stating that the payor bank may make its determination of the customer's
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D. Standard of Care
The final area of nonuniform changes in Articles 3 and 4 made by state
legislatures relates to the obligation of care owed by a bank to its customers.
Section 4-406(e) changes the results in a situation where the lack of care by
both the customer and the bank contributed to the loss.3"' Under the former
section, a bank was responsible if both it and the customer were negligent.3"
Under the new section, the customer is responsible if it was negligent unless
the customer proves that the bank's failure "substantially contributed" to the
loss.3" If "substantial contribution" is proven, then the bank and the customer
share the loss.324 This section places additional liability on a bank customer.
Bank negligence must be a substantial contributor to the loss before any
liability will attach. The California legislature eliminated the qualifier
"substantial" from section 4-406(e) before adoption.3" The New York Law
Revision Commission has recommended modifying section 4-406 to spread
account balance for a decision to dishonor for insufficient funds at any time between the time the item
is received and it is returned. U.C.C. § 4-402(c) (1995). On its face, new section 4-402(c) appears to
authorize a bank to debit checks before posting credits received on the same day, thus maximizing
bounced checks and bounced check fees. The California and West Virginia Codes include official
comments stating that a bank would fail to act in good faith if its failure to credit deposits of funds
available for withdrawal as of right prior to debiting items caused the account to be overdrawn. CAL.
COM. CODE § 4402 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 46-4-402 cmt. 4 (1993).
The California comment reads, in relevant part:
In determining whether a check presented for payment will create an overdraft, the prevailing
banking practice is to first credit the customer's account for deposits made on the day of
presentment If that credit represents fumds available for withdrawal as of right, it is taken into
account in determining whether the check presented for payment will or will not create an
overdraft. A bank failing to follow that practice would not be acting in good faith if the failure
caused the customer's account to be considered overdrawn.
CAL. COM. CODE § 4402 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1996).
As a practical matter, a bank outside of California or West Virginia should not rely on revised
section 4-402 for authority to dishonor debits before posting credits. In a meeting preceding the
California comment and nonuniform amendments, representatives of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws stated in the presence of the author that section 4-402 had
never been intended to authorize a process of posting that would maximize bounced checks. Thus, the
California comment may provide insight to courts in other states about the purpose and limits of
section 4-402, and about the degree to which the obligation of good faith can influence conduct which
appears to be expressly authorized by specific code provisions.
321. U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (1995).
322. U.C.C. § 4-406(3) (amended 1990).
323. U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (1995).
324. Id.
325. CAL. COM. CODE § 4406 (West Supp. 1996).
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some of the risks of lack of sight review of signatures to the bank.32 6 It would
treat the absence of sight review as a negligent behavior when applying the
comparative negligence standard.3 27
Section 3-103(a)(7) expressly defines ordinary care not to require sight
examination of checks so long as the bank complies with its own procedures
and those procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage.328 Previously, there was an argument that sight review would be
required, at least in some cases. "Sight review" means visual examination of
the check and signature by a human being. Banks and the Conference argued
vigorously, and persuasively, that sight review of items before payment is
simply too expensive to be worthwhile. However, the full benefit of
eliminating sight review accrues to the bank, while the cost of foregoing this
review is shared by the bank and the customer. When a customer is the victim
of a series of forged or altered checks which the customer does not discover,
but which might have been found before payment through sight review, the
change in the definition of ordinary care will reallocate these losses entirely to
the customer.
The New York Law Revision Commission report recognizes the need for
high-speed check clearing and characterizes any requirement for sight review
of all checks as unrealistic. 329 At the same time, it concludes that the change
326. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299.
327. Id.
328. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) & cmt. 5 (1995).
329. The report states in relevant part on the issue ofordinary care, sight review, and preclusion:
The proposed definition of "ordinary care" has been criticized as encouraging banks to
examine fewer checks because the resultant losses will be borne by the ' customers. The
Commission believes that this criticism overstates the likely effect of the revised definition on bank
operations. After all, the losses resulting from most failures to detect forgeries will be continue to
be borne by the bank, because it is absolutely liable to its customer unless the customer's actions
place it within the sphere of a preclusion rule, and such preclusion cases are unusual, representing
only a small fraction of all checks.
The real question is whether the definition of ordinary care results in an equitable allocation of
losses for cases in which a customer's conduct initially places him or her within a preclusion rule.
The Commission believes that the answer to this question is no.
The inappropriateness of the proposed revision is best seen by comparing the benefits and
costs to the bank of examining checks individually in the absence of customer conduct that triggers
preclusion with those benefits and costs in a preclusion situation. In the absence of circumstances
that result in preclusion of the customer's claim, the rles in Articles 3 and 4 result in the payor
bank being absolutely liable for paying a check over the forged signature of its customer.
Nonetheless, payor banks examine the drawers' signatures on only a tiny fraction of checks
presented to them. The reason is simple - it is less expensive to recredit a customer's account for the
occasional forged check than it is to perform a sight examination of all checks presented. Thus, by
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in the definition of ordinary care leads to an unfair allocation of loss in the
preclusion situation under sections 3-406(b) and 4-406(e).330 Therefore, the
Law Revision Commission recommends that the preclusion of sections 3-406
and 4-406 be modified so that the comparative negligence rule comes into
play as against the payor bank if it has failed to examine the item and that
failure contributed (under section 4406(e)) or substantially contributed
(under section 3-406(b)) to the loss. 33'
E. Lessons from the State Response to Articles 3 and 4
The New York Law Revision Commission recommended rejecting one
aspect of the loss allocation in UCC Articles 3 and 4 proposed by the ALI and
NCCUSL.332 It also recommended a variety of other nonuniform amendments
to Articles 3 and 4 to address problems in those uniform acts for
choosing to examine only certain checks (typically those over a particular amount), a bank gets the
benefit of the cost reductions compared to the cost of examining every check and bears the losses
flowing from the failure to detect forgeries that would have been discovered in a sight examination.
In other words, in non-preclusion situations the bank bears 100% of the cost of failing to detect
forgeries that would have been detected by a sight examination.
Compare this with a preclusion situation. Assume, for example, that (i) a bank has paid a
check over a poor forgery of the drawer's signature that would easily have been detected had the
bank examined the check, (ii) the bank's decision to not examine the check was consistent with its
internal procedures and with general banking practice (and, thus, is consistent with the proposed
definition of "ordinary care"), (iii) the customer fits within one of the preclusion rules, and (iv) as
between them, the bank's failure to examine the check (which would have detected the obvious
forgery) was 800/ responsible for the loss and the customer's action that triggered the preclusion
was 20% responsible. Under the proposed rule, the customer would be totally precluded from its
claim against the bank because the bank would be held to have exercised ordinary care in paying
the check. Thus, the existence of the 20% responsibility of the customer would relieve the bank of
100% of the cost it otherwise would have bome.
Therefore, it appears that the application of the proposed definition of ordinary care in the
context of these preclusion rules is likely to provide the same sort of windfalls to banks that the
"contributory negligence rule" of current Article 3 (abandoned in the revision in favor of a
comparative causation system) occasionally provides to customers. The Commission does not
believe that such windfalls are appropriate. Accordingly, it recommends amendments to the
Official Text of the proposed revisions that are designed to compare the customer's responsibility
for the loss with the loss flowing from the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care or to examine the
check to detect alteration or forgery of the drawer's signature (even if that failure does not, itself;
constitute failure to exercise ordinary care). So amended, the bank would bear a portion of the loss
if sight examination would have revealed the forgery or alteration.
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 15-16.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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consumers.3 Other states have also made a variety of nonuniform
amendments. Perhaps these nonuniform amendments could have been
avoided if serious attention had been paid in the drafting process to the
consumer impact of the legal changes in Articles 3 and 4.334
The state solutions to the problems posed by Articles 3 and 4 are
surprisingly similar. This indicates that the Conference and the ALI could
have achieved more uniformity if they had fully examined and addressed
these questions when drafting their uniform law.
The fact that state legislators in a number of states were willing to make so
many nonuniform changes in the highly technical subject matter of Articles 3
and 4 strongly suggests that the Conference and the ALI cannot expect state
legislators to simply accept a recommendation that UCC articles offered for
enactment are the work of experts and must be accepted in full. If legislators
were willing to ask how these payment system statutes would affect their
constituents, they are far more likely to ask those same questions when the
Conference presents to them laws governing such ordinary transactions as the
purchase of consumer goods, licensing of software, and loans secured by
automobiles and other personal property.
The nature of the nonuniform amendments that some states made to
Articles 3 and 4 suggests that state legislators will not be satisfied with
sweeping statements that the UCC revisions are the product of an intensive
and expert process. Instead, legislators can be expected to ask the sponsors of
UCC legislation the same questions that the Conference and the ALI ought to
examine before adoption of any article of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Those questions include:
1. How does this change affect consumers?
2. Are consumers' existing rights or remedies under the statute or
333. Id.
334. For more information on the impact of Articles 3 and 4, see Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer
Issues in the RevisedArticles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 119 (1993); Mark E.
Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank's Duty
of Ordinary Care Under the 1990 Revision to the Uniform Commercial Code When It Honors Forged
Checks, 63 TEMPLE L. REV. 729 (1990); Gail Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REv. 679 (1991); and Edward L. Rubin,
Efficiency Equity and the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4,42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991).
For a discussion of how the California legislature decided to require nonuniform amendments to
Articles 3 and 4 in the absence of any consumer-group opposition to the revisions, see Gail Hillebrand,
UCC Articles 3 and 4 in the California Legislature: A New Focus on Consumer Protection in Uniform
Law Proposals, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 123 (1993).
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other law being weakened or discarded?
3. Do the changes in law which are made to promote efficiency have
side effects which change the balance of rights and obligations or the
allocation of risks between consumers and commercial entities?
4. Does the statute provide adequate remedies which consumers will
actually be able to use?
The ability of the Conference and the ALl to analyze and respond to these
questions goes to the heart of their credibility as uniform law bodies.
V. PROPOSED STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE UNIFORM LAW DRAFTING
PROCESS
The serious structural barriers to full participation by affected groups in
the UCC drafting process make it particularly critical that the Conference and
the American Law Institute critically examine proposed drafts for fairness to
all affected groups, with particular care taken to consider the impact on
industries and groups other than those most directly affected by the revision.
To date, the full Conference has asked these difficult questions about the
draft of Article 2B, but not about the draft of Article 9. The Conference also
has completed a year-long Consumer Issues Subcommittee process for
Articles 2 and 9. However, the key question asked of those subcommittees
seemed to be whether anything should be done about consumer issues at all in
the Code. Apparently the Conference leadership did not ask those
subcommittees to analyze the myriad changes to the Code being proposed by
the drafting committees, or to provide analysis and recommendations about
whether those changes would be fair to consumers in their transactions under
the Code. To its credit, the Article 9 Consumer Issues Subcommittee did
undertake this type of analysis, at least with respect to those issues raised
before it by consumer advocates, if not with respect to all of the many other
changes in the Article 9 draft. The members of the Conference raised the
question of fairness to consumers explicitly in connection with Article 2B at
their summer 1996 meeting. The effect of the widespread expressions of
concern by the members of the Conference will not be known until the
Article 2B drafting committee completes its revised draft. However, less than
four months before that draft is scheduled for a final reading, the draft still has
not achieved a reasonable balance between the interests of licensors and
licensees.
The American Law Institute has taken a careful look at the Article 9 draft
1997]
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with respect to how it will affect unsecured creditors in bankruptcy and the
bankruptcy process. It has not yet made the same examination with respect to
the impact on small business debtors or consumer debtors. 35 Without careful
examination and analysis of the impact of proposed legal changes and new
laws on both consumers and other under-represented groups by both the
Conference and the ALI, it is unlikely that the final products will meet the
high standards for objectivity which the product of a law reform process
should satisfy.
What is to be done? Should the uniform law process be abandoned in
favor of individual state legislative efforts or federal law?336 Several
improvements to the uniform law process should be attempted before
abolition is recommended. One such improvement is the funding by the
Conference and the ALI for both time and travel for consumer representatives
to attend drafting committee and Conference meetings and to provide the
Conference and the ALI with practical information and analyses about how
proposed changes in the law would affect consumers. 37 However, travel
335. Individual voices within the ALI, however, have started to ask important questions. See, e.g.,
Letter from Professor William J. Woodward, Jr. to Professor Marion Benfield, Chair of the Article 9
Consumer Issues Subcommittee (Mar. 6, 1996) (on file with author). Professor Woodward points out
that Article 9's authorization of security interests in after-acquired property of individuals other than
consumer goods may interact with its broadened definition of intangibles to permit conferral of an
interest in the revenue stream from a patent or copyright for a future invention or future work. Id. at 2.
He suggests that permitting an after-acquired interest in this type of property of individuals is
inconsistent with the public policies that prevent or restrict assignment of future wages. Id. at 2-3.
336. In writing about the weaknesses in the uniform law process of drafting Articles 3 and 4,
Professor Rubin has suggested that federal law is the proper approach, at least for law related to the
payment system. Rubin, supra note 77, at 773-81.
Consumer advocates generally argue that federal law has a place in the regulation of national
commerce, but that such federal law should accommodate more protective state laws, in order to
permit states to serve as laboratories for experimentation and to maximize their ability to preserve
important state policies for the protection of state citizens. Federal consumer protection statutes
generally take this approach, permitting more protective state laws so long as they are "not
inconsistent" (i.e., it is possible to comply with both the state and the federal statute). Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1994).
337. This proposal would not provide funds for the work of this author. Consumers Union does
not accept funds which are raised from business or corporate sources, even if they are administered or
awarded by a nonprofit entity. However, other organizations which ably represent consumers,
including resource-strapped legal services programs and public consumer assistance offices, might be
able to accept such funds. In this time of extremely tight budgets, it is highly unrealistic to expect legal
services programs to be able to volunteer the time of their attorneys to a process as long and as
technical as UCC revision. See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 47 (discussing the inability of many legal
services programs to accept cases posing legal issues ranging from landlord-tenant law to car
repossessions). To its credit, the American Law Institute has provided travel funding to an attorney
representing the National Consumer Law Center on Articles 2 and 9. It also has provided travel
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funding is no panacea. Adding one or two consumer representatives to a
roomful of licensor, seller, or creditor representatives has only so much
impact. Moreover, the absence of stable funding for many organizations
which represent consumers creates the probability of turnover which is
detrimental to effectiveness in this type of a long and collegial process. This
can be partially addressed by inducing law professors who teach in the
consumer area or who have prior practice experience representing consumers
to participate in the process. However, academics may not feel comfortable
with the kind of visibility or persistence that is needed to be effective when
one is consistently outnumbered ten-to-one by industry representatives
holding a contrary point of view.
Another change that could be considered would be to limit the number of
industry representatives to whom speaking privileges are conferred at drafting
committee meetings. Federal regulatory agencies sometimes use a process
called regulatory negotiation, or "reg-neg," in which each affected group is
given a specific number of seats at the table for discussion of the scope,
parameters and language of a regulation. This process can suffer from an
imbalance of time, money and expertise, but it can reduce the skewing effect
on an imbalance in the sheer number of participants per group in the process.
The American Law Institute could select its drafting committee
representatives by appointing people whose expertise, practice background,
and points of view are not yet represented by the members selected by
NCCUSL. The ALI has a somewhat broader membership than the NCCUSL,
has many more members upon which to draw, and has the flexibility in
member selection to diversify its membership somewhat more quickly than
does the NCCUSL. The American Bar Association also could use its advisor
slots to bring added diversity of viewpoints and practice backgrounds to the
draffing committees.
In selecting its members for a drafting committee, the Conference and the
ALI should attempt to select members with diverse practice backgrounds to
the maximum possible extent. Both the Conference and the ALI should also
institutionalize attention to the impact of proposed legal changes on
consumers and on other under-represented parties. To do this, each group
could commission reports, at least annually, to analyze how the changes in
each pending draft to date will affect such consumers and other under-
funding to a public interest lawyer to speak on behalf of consumers in the drafting process for Article
2B.
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represented groups, and to propose changes that would ameliorate any ill
effects identified. Even more importantly, each organization should create an
internal function, analogous to a public adviser, to participate in the work of
the drafting committees and advise the drafting committees, the leadership,
and the membership of each institution about the probable impacts of the
drafts on consumers and other under-represented groups.
Another step that should be considered is the use of a public adviser. The
public adviser concept was developed in the public utility field to help
counterbalance the power of regulated industries in utility retaking. The
public adviser helps the public to navigate the procedure of the Public
Utilities Commission. It assists members of the public in learning how to
present information to the decisionmaking body. In California, the public
adviser is required by statute to publish an annual guide that describes the
scheduled proceedings and decisions to be made in the coming year,
including names and phone numbers of persons with responsibility for
specific matters.33 An analogous report for the uniform law process would
identify key issues being considered for change, in plain and understandable
language, and could be widely distributed to legal services groups, consumer
groups such as the members of the Consumer Federation of America, and
consumer professionals, including the members of the American Council on
Consumer Interests and the National Association of Consumer Agency
Administrators.
For Article 9, for example, the questions posed for comment would
include the basic question that is driving the Article 9 revision: "Should
secured creditors prevail over unsecured creditors and borrowers to a greater
extent than they now do?" It would also include important subsidiary
questions such as "Should the Code be changed to favor refinancing of
finance company loans to a greater extent that current law?" and "Should
creditors be able to deprive consumers of statutory damages available under
current law if the creditor can show that its violation of law resulted from a
bona fide error?" These questions will be decided by the draft of Article 9,
but they are not obvious on the face of the draft to nonlawyer consumer
professionals, volunteers running U.S. consumer groups, or consumer
attorneys who do not specialize in Article 9 On the face of the Article 9 draft,
for example, the question about whether refinancing should be more favored
is presented in the context of an obscure change to the definition of a PMSI.
338. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 321,321.5 (West Supp. 1996).
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A simple annual report describing how under-represented groups will be
affected by changes contemplated by the drafting committees might also
motivate increased participation by a variety of other under-represented
groups. For example, a group representing the interests of small businesses is
unlikely to respond to a 200 page Article 9 draft in the mail. However, that
same group might express strong feelings in response to a simple, plain
language query about the basic policy question in the Article 9 revision:
"Should secured creditors prevail over unsecured creditors and borrowers to a
greater extent than they now do?" A group representing small businesses
might also express strong views about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the
drafting committee's assumption underlying the Article 9 revision that
making it easier for secured creditors to tie up every personal property asset
of a small business and its owner will improve the amount or terms of credit
offered to small businesses.
Another approach which could be considered is the use of a "consumer
ombudsman," a person or group of persons within the Conference charged
with evaluating the effect of proposed Code changes on consumers at the
earliest possible time and seeking changes to ameliorate harm that proposed
changes would otherwise impose on consumers.
These proposals have serious limits. A public adviser can make it easier to
comment on drafts, but in this author's experience written comments have
limited effect if the commenter is not present at the drafting committee
meetings to orally present and pursue the point. In addition, a consumer
ombudsman is unlikely to be effective in the collegial, informal world of the
NCCUSL or the ALI if the ombudsman functions only at the staff level.
Instead, a committee of full members of each body would have to undertake
the job of contributing this viewpoint on an ongoing basis. The Conference
leadership would have to convince potential committee members of their
commitment to the consumer inapt oversight function before members could
be expected to contribute the large amount of time necessary to perform that
work effectively.339 One or more members of an "under-represented interests"
committee would have to be appointed as full members of each drafting
committee. Those members would have to commit to learn about the area and
to serve as a "watchdog" on a set of issues which may be unfamiliar. In
addition, the Conference leadership would have to make the reports of the
339. The efforts of the leadership of the ABA Business Law Section to diversify the voices heard
in the Business Law Section provided the inspiration for this idea.
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"watchdog" committee available to its members along with the drafts, to
promote thoughtful discussion about the impact of the changes on consumers
and other under-represented groups being proposed.
American Law Institute member Harry Sigman has suggested that drafts
should remain in circulation longer as a means to promote public discussion
and debate before enactment.34 This could be helpful, if there is a process for
thoughtful reconsideration of the draft in the light of issues identified in that
comment period. Such a step cannot substitute, however, for more
fundamental improvements in the drafting process. If the NCCUSL and the
ALI cannot afford to both solicit and independently develop information
about how proposed changes in law will affect consumers, then they should
not be promulgating changes to the Uniform Commercial Code which affect
consumers.
VI. CONCLUSION
State legislatures are unlikely to enact revised UCC articles if they
overwhelmingly favor secured creditors or licensors. A perception that the
uniform law drafts do not include workable rules for consumer commerce
may also hurt the reputations of the Conference and the ALl as objective
crafters of uniform law. Five states made nonuniform amendments to Articles
3 and 4 on consumer issues. The New York Law Revision Commission has
recommended additional nonuniform amendments to Articles 3 and 4. The
willingness of state legislators to make nonuniform changes in the highly
technical Articles 3 and 4 .suggests that state legislators will carefully
scrutinize the drafts of Articles 2, 2B, and 9 for adverse impacts on
consumers when those drafts are presented for enactment.
In recent years some academics have severely criticized the uniform law
drafting process by suggesting, that it is or can become a captive of affected
industries. As of the summer of 1996, the Article 2 drafting process had not
shown that weakness. The Article 2B drafting process, although dealing with
similar issues, had dramatically illustrated the possibility of a drafting
committee approving a seriously unbalanced draft.
The Article 2 drafting committee has examined Article 2 in the light of
contracting practices, especially the widespread use of standard form
340. Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two Specific Proposals, 28 LOY,
L.A. L. REv. 325,325-32 (1994).
[VOL. 75:69
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/3
THE UCC DRAFTING PROCESS
contracts and the role of remote sellers, in creating expectations about the
goods being sold. The drafting process has recognized the vast changes in
commerce which have occurred since Article 2 was first written.34" ' The
product of the Article 2B drafting committee gives less reason for optimism
about the ability of the uniform law drafting process to create balanced
proposed legislation. That draft, which was presented to the Conference in the
summer of 1996 and heavily criticized by members of the Conference at that
time, favored the interests of software and information providers. Although it
has been somewhat improved since then, it still authorizes all unexpected and
unreasonable standard form contract terms if there was a manifestation of
assent or if the consumer would not have refused the whole contract. It still
would create a statutory right for a licensor to reach into the computer of a
private consumer or a small business and seize the licensor's software out of
it without warning or legal process. It still would preempt some aspects of
state consumer protection statutes. The scope of the further changes to the
Article 2B draft before it is presented for adoption will show whether or not
the uniform law drafting process can produce sound public policy in the face
of high industry interest.
Whether the Article 9 drafting process will produce a draft which is fair
for consumers remains unknown. There are causes for very serious concern.
The draft consistently codifies pro-creditor rules previously left to case law. It
creates a new defense interfering with statutory damages recoverable under
existing Article 9, and it fails to fully address the full problem of low values
in the sale of collateral. The Article 9 draft also unquestionably tilts the
playing field between a small commercial borrower and its creditors, giving
341. The author has participated as an observer for Consumers Union to the Article 2 drafting
process since 1992. In some ways, the Article 2 process is an example of how a uniform law process
should work. The Article 2 drafting committee has listened to both the consumer representatives and to
the many industry representatives who have participated in its meetings. The drafting committee has
rejected many changes in the text of Article 2 proposed both by consumer advocates and by affected
industries. At the same time, it has developed a theoretically sound new section to address a key legal
and practical issue that arises in consumer commerce-the use of standard form contracts and terms.
Three serious qualifications must accompany this praise of the Article 2 drafting process. First, the
absence of travel funds and of staff has severely restrained the participation of consumer
representatives and organizations at many consumer organizations for such a sustained process.
Second, representatives of small businesses as buyers have not participated to a large extent, perhaps
for the same reasons. Third, as discussed in Part I on structural barriers, it is natural for decisionmakers
to assume that the experiences of others are fundamentally similar to their own. Such an assumption
can unintentionally but severely bias a process against persons who have lower levels of sophistication
or bargaining power than is common among upper and upper-middle income attorneys and law
professors.
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the creditor new forms of Article 9 collateral, making it easier to take an
Article 9 security interest in all the assets of a small business, and eliminating
some of the remedies now available to the business debtor if its creditor fails
to fulfill its obligations under Article 9. On the other hand, the Article 9 draft
contains a few changes which will be valuable to consumers, including a
stronger standard for evaluating dispositions involving a potential conflict of
interest (voted for but not yet in the draft), reciprocal attorneys' fees for
consumers, and a limited right of reinstatement. An important notice of how
deficiencies are calculated has also been approved. The final shape of these
three drafts will tell whether the uniform law drafting process is a viable
model for law creation.
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